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To guide practice on divestitures, we investigate the role of the recipient and the number and characteristics of
the divested products by simulating post-merger outcomes for all relevant cases. We ﬁnd that in this setting
with large multiproduct ﬁrms, the competition authority's most effective means to dampen adverse post-
merger outcomes are to aim for a small recipient ﬁrm and attain a large number of divested products. Enforcing
larger divestitures in terms of market share and raising the average cross-price elasticity between the merging
parties' divested and retained products strengthen the dampening effect further.
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Competition authorities frequently require that merging parties di-
vest a number of brands or operations in order to clear a proposed
merger. As we document below, little is known about the impact of
such divestitures despite their prominent role in practice. In this paper
we use the 2001 takeover of the Swedish Pripps brewery by the Danish
brewer Carlsberg to examine the effect of the divestitures on merger
outcomes. Our research question is twofold: Firstly, we want to provide
a clean case study of the effect of divestitures on prices and welfare in
this merger. Secondly, wewant to systematically examine how thewel-
fare effects of divestitures depend on the acquirer, the number of
divested products, their market share and their average cross-priceAuthority, Handelsbankens
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(Research International) for
ed by the editor (Julie Holland
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minar audiences at Paris School
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ipants at the BECCLE, CRESSE,
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. This is an open access article underelasticities with the retained products. Our ﬁndings are partly speciﬁc
to this particular merger but we believe that the results and the heuris-
tic algorithm usedwill be of use for competition authorities in charge of
proposing divestitures in other markets and merger cases.
A number of features make this merger in the Swedish beer market
an interesting case for examining divestitures. The merging parties ac-
count for a substantial share of total sales in the Swedish beer market:
Carlsberg's and Pripps' pre-merger market shares by volume were 29
and 17%, respectively. The divestitures are substantial: at the time of
the merger they account for 6% of volume. We have access to barcode
level data on prices and quantities, aggregated by month, for the
wholemarket, for a period from January 1996 to January 2003, thus cov-
ering two years after the merger. Knowledge of the retailer's (exoge-
nous) markup rule allows us to back out wholesale prices precisely.
We ﬁrst examine the effects of divestitures on prices in a simple
model and highlight that the prices of divested products should fall,
ceteris paribus. Examining the merger with difference-in-difference
methods we indeed ﬁnd that the prices of divested products fall by
about 3%. To be able to examine various counterfactual policies we fol-
low the seminal work of Berry et al. (1995, hereafter BLP) and estimate
a random coefﬁcients logit model of demand.We ﬁnd that the effects of
the divestitures are sizable: the divestitures lower the predicted price
increase from 3 to 1.6% for Carlsberg and from 6.5 to 4.9% for Pripps.
For the average market price increase, the divestitures lower the pre-
dicted price hike by two thirds, from 1.6 to 0.5%.the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
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useful for evaluating themerger. The difference-in-difference estimates
describe the ex-post developments of prices under transparent assump-
tions even if, as we discuss below, themerger between twomajor ﬁrms
in a national market should lead one to view the control group with
some caution. The BLP demand system is useful for ex-ante simulations
and for exploring alternative divestitures. We use our structural de-
mand model to pin down which attributes of the divestiture require-
ments matter most for keeping price rises and consumer welfare
losses in check. We ﬁnd that the recipient ﬁrm of the divested beers
has a large impact on post-merger outcomes. In the actual merger this
ﬁrm has a negligible market share and can therefore barely use the di-
vestitures to generate market power for its existing portfolio of brands.
Varying the recipient of the divested beers is associated with average
price increases ranging from 1.1% to 0.5%. We also examine the compo-
sition of the set of divestitures using amethod that can approximate the
distribution of all potential post-merger outcomes for a given range of
market shares for the divested products. We ﬁnd that in this market
with largemultiproductﬁrms the number of divested beers is an impor-
tant explanation for low price increases and limitedwelfare losses post-
merger. Raising the number of divestitures by 1% reduces the average
post-merger price increase by almost 3% and reduces the loss in con-
sumer welfare by almost 2.7%. The market share of the divestitures
and the substitutability between the divestitures and the merging
parties' products also have statistically signiﬁcant and economically im-
portant effects on post-merger price increases and consumer welfare
losses. Raising both of these parameters dampens adverse outcomes.
Using both a difference-in-difference and a BLP demand system also
allows us to compare results. Important qualitative patterns are com-
mon to the two methods: prices of divested products fall, prices of leg-
acy products for the acquirer of the divested products rise and despite
the merger of the two largest ﬁrms in a concentrated market there are
small price effects. Nevertheless, as in the previous literature, we ﬁnd
some discrepancies between the ex-post difference-in-difference pre-
dictions and the ex-ante structural simulation of the merger when we
keep marginal costs at their pre-merger level. Efﬁciency gains are likely
to be one contributor to the discrepancies but lacking separate evidence
on product level marginal costs surrounding themerger we cannot rule
out other explanations— it may be that the difference-in-difference es-
timates do not accurately capture the ceteris paribus impact of the
merger or there may be concerns with the estimated demand system
or ﬁrmsmay not be playing static oligopoly or fail to optimize aswe dis-
cuss below. Our discussion should prove relevant for future ex-post
evaluations of merger simulations.1
Let us brieﬂy review the previous literature on divestitures. In both
the European Union and the United States a majority of mergers that
are subjected to closer scrutiny are cleared subject to remedies in the
form of requirements regarding structure (such as divestments) or be-
havior (such as length of contracts). Formergers thatmerit closer atten-
tion, prohibiting them or permitting as proposed are the exception —
clearing subject to remedies is the rule.2 In many jurisdictions, divesti-
tures are the most prominent form of remedy. Indeed, the European
Commission's notice on remedies states that “a general distinction can
be made between divestitures, other structural remedies, such as
granting access to key infrastructure or inputs on non-discriminatory
terms, and commitments relating to the future behavior of the merged
entity. Divestiture commitments are the best way to eliminate competition1 See Peters (2006), Weinberg (2011), Weinberg and Hosken (2013) or Björnerstedt
and Verboven (2013) for examples of this, as of yet, small literature.
2 For instance, among the proposedmergers that were subject to the Phase II procedure
by the EuropeanCompetition Authority between 1990 and 2011, 56%were cleared subject
to remedies. In comparison, only 13% of the proposed mergers were prohibited at this
stage and 28% were permitted as proposed. Similarly, of 144 mergers challenged by US
competition authorities between 2003 and 2007, 64% were cleared after remedies had
been agreed upon (Tenn and Yun (2011)).concerns resulting from horizontal overlaps.” (European Commission
(2008), paragraph 17, emphasis added).
Despite their importance in merger practice, the literature examin-
ing the role of divestitures in mergers is scant. Some, largely qualitative,
descriptions of divestiture practice can be found in for instance Elzinga
(1969), Federal Trade Commission (1999) and DG Competition
(2005). The latter two studies establish that in most cases the divested
assets are still in operation a few years after the divestiture, and in this
sense divestiture policy has been successful. These studies are silent
on price reactions surrounding the mergers, however, and there are
only a few detailed case studies of the price effects of divestitures. In
one such study Tenn and Yun (2011) provide a before–after analysis
of the merger between J&J and Pﬁzer and show that prices of divested
brands fell post-divestiture. Pham and Prentice (2013) examine amerg-
er in the Australian cigarette industry that involved divestitures and
compare results to counterfactual simulations based on a random coef-
ﬁcients logit model of demand. Data limitations force them to estimate
demand for a period several years before the actualmerger, but their re-
sults nevertheless suggest that divestitures reduced price increases. 3
Apart from the ability to follow a large merger on a market with good
data we are also attracted by the beer market having been a prominent
testing ground for merger simulations right from the beginning of this
literature; Baker and Bresnahan (1985) and Hausman et al. (1994) use
simulations to examine prospective mergers in the US beer market,
and Pinkse and Slade (2004) apply them tomergers in theUKbeermar-
ket. Neither of these papers examine divestitures. 4 Ashenfelter et al.
(2013) examine the role of efﬁciencies in the US merger between
Coors and Miller and ﬁnd that a predicted price increase of some 2%
was largely offset by declines in marginal costs. Their paper is comple-
mentary to ours as both show how substantial concentrations in the
beer industry fail to lead to theprice hikes that onemay ex ante have ex-
pected. Efﬁciencies due tomore efﬁcient transport is an important facet
in their study while the evidence in our case points to an important role
for divestitures.
This paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides a stylized the-
oretical example that illustrates the potential for downward pricing
pressure when divestiture requirements are imposed on a merger. The
following section describes the institutional setting, the data and the
merger. Section 4 describes price developments surrounding the merg-
er using the difference-in-difference methodology. Section 5 details our
structural model and the estimation results. In Section 6 we use the
structural model to examine the impact of divestitures and efﬁciencies
on the merger in question. Section 7 contains our systematic explora-
tion of counterfactual divestitures and in Section 8 we provide conclud-
ing remarks.
2. Stylized example
To provide intuition for our ﬁndings, we adapt the concept of up-
ward pricing pressure (UPP) as developed by Farrell and Shapiro
(2010) to explore the role of divestitures in price setting. To be concise,
we present a stylized example and for the purposes of exposition ab-
stract from efﬁciency gains. Suppose there are only two ﬁrms, where
ﬁrmMP (multi-product) owns products 1 and 2, while ﬁrm SP (single-
product) owns product 3. Let pj, mcj and sj denote price, marginal cost3 The theoretical work on divestitures is similarly limited. Compte et al. (2002) show
that divestitures may facilitate collusion if they lead to a more symmetric industry
structure. Cosnita and Tropeano (2009) examine howa competition authority can use pol-
icies regarding divestitures to induce themerging parties to reveal private information on
the efﬁciency gains of themerger. Vasconselos (2010) uses a stylized setting with four ex-
ante symmetric Cournot competitors to show that divestitures can increase consumer sur-
plus by creating a more efﬁcient competitor.
4 See also Hellerstein (2008) or Rojas (2008), who examine the beer market with sim-
ilar tools as the merger simulation literature does, but focus on the pass-through of ex-
change rates and of excise taxes, respectively.
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tions of the ﬁrms' maximization problems are as follows.5
p1 ¼ mc1−
∂s1
∂p1
 −1
s1 þ ∂s2∂p1
p2−mc2ð Þ
 
p3 ¼ mc3−
∂s3
∂p3
 −1
s3
With product prices being strategic complements, the cross-price
effect ∂s2/∂p1 is (strictly) positive. In response to a price increase of
product 1, a fraction of its consumers substitute away to product 2.
The multi-product ﬁrm MP internalizes this effect and therefore sets
higher prices for both products 1 and 2 as compared to the case when
each product is owned by a separate ﬁrm. We can now think about
two cases that are directly related to the Carlsberg–Pripps merger and
our counterfactual merger scenarios. First, suppose that ﬁrmsMP and
SP merge and that no divestitures are required. The optimal post-
merger prices of products 1 and 3, ~p1 and ~p3 , satisfy the following
conditions.
~p1 ¼ mc1−
∂s1
∂~p1
 −1
s1 þ ∂s2∂~p1
~p2−mc2ð Þ þ
∂s3
∂~p1
~p3−mc3ð Þ
 
~p3 ¼ mc3−
∂s3
∂~p3
 −1
s3 þ ∂s1∂~p3
~p1−mc1ð Þ þ
∂s2
∂~p3
~p2−mc2ð Þ
 
We now deﬁne the instantaneous pricing pressure at the product
level as the difference between the post- and pre-merger ﬁrst-order
conditions, Δp1≡~p1−p1. To do so, we evaluate the post-merger ﬁrst-
order conditions at pre-merger prices. This makes clear that UPP is an
approximation to a merger simulation. We do not solve for post-
merger equilibrium prices, but pin down the direction of price changes
following the merger.
Δp1
p1
¼−η^−11
∂s3
∂p1
p3−mc3ð Þ
 
N 0
Δp3
p3
¼−η^−13
∂s1
∂p3
p1−mc1ð Þ þ
∂s2
∂p3
p2−mc2ð Þ
 
N 0
Δp1/p1 is the net relative price change in response to themerger and
η^1≡ð∂s1=∂p1Þp1 is the semi-elasticity of demand for product 1 and gives
the change in market share of product 1 in response to a one percent
change in p1.
The product-level pricing pressure of product 1 is driven by two
components: its own-price (semi-)elasticity and the diverted proﬁt
margin from its former competitor product 3. Only the diverted margin
of the former rival matters for the instantaneous pricing pressure, be-
cause we are evaluating each ﬁrm's price response to the merger at
pre-merger prices. The diversion effect stemming from products that
were owned before the merger is netted out. In the absence of any di-
vestiture requirements, we thus obtain the classic result of Deneckere
and Davidson (1985) that prices increase post-merger. Note that the
price adjustment of product 3 is driven by two proﬁt diversion terms
and, conditional on prices and magnitudes of the cross-price effects,
the price of product 3 changes more in response to the merger than
the price for product 1 does.
To shed some light on the effect of divestitures, consider a second
case where ﬁrmsMP and SP are cleared to merge under the condition5 The ﬁrst-order condition for product 2 is analogous to that for product 1.that product 2 is divested as an independent rival ﬁrm. The pricing
pressures for each of the products are then.
Δp1
p1
¼−η^−11
∂s3
∂p1
p3−mc3ð Þ−
∂s2
∂p1
p2−mc2ð Þ
 
bN0
Δp2
p2
¼−η^−12 −
∂s1
∂p2
p1−mc1ð Þ
 
b0
Δp3
p3
¼−η^−13
∂s1
∂p3
p1−mc1ð Þ
 
N 0
We ﬁrst note that the price of the divested product 2 falls unambig-
uously. Its post-merger pricing does not take into account the diverted
proﬁt margin to product 1 and thereby its price falls. The sign of the
price change for product 1, however, is ambiguous. If the diverted
proﬁts from variety 2 exceed those of the new addition to ﬁrm MP's
portfolio, product 3, the merged ﬁrm ﬁnds it optimal to reduce the
price of product 1 following the merger. As before, the price of product
3 unambiguously rises post-merger, because it beneﬁts from the
diverted proﬁt margin stemming from product 1. Thus, our example
shows that properly chosen divestitures can induce falling prices for
the divested varieties, and if the divestitures are sufﬁciently important
in terms of their diverted proﬁtmargins, it is also possible that the prices
of the merging parties' products fall post-merger. Finally, the example
illustrates that ceteris paribus, the smaller party to a merger raises
prices more strongly because it internalizes more diverted proﬁt mar-
gins than the bigger party.
How does this carry over to the demand model that we estimate
below? The structural model gives us estimates of ∂si/∂pj for arbitrary
i, j. The own- and cross-price elasticities depend on our estimates of het-
erogeneous consumer preferences and their interplay with product
characteristics. The price effects of a merger depend on the estimated
elasticities and on which products merge and on which products are
divested. The structural demand model that we use allows for the
same ambiguity as the stylized example and our ﬁndings are therefore
driven by the data and not the speciﬁc assumptions placed on demand.
3. The Swedish beer market and the merger
3.1. The retail setting and the data
Our data set includes themonthly nationwide retail sales of all beers
with a minimum alcoholic content of 3.5% of volume and has been pro-
vided to us by the Swedish retail monopoly for alcohol, Systembolaget.
The data covers the period from January 1996 to January 2003. The
merger between Carlsberg and Pripps was consummated in February
2001. We therefore have data for a post-merger period of almost two
years. Sales volume per month and price per liter measured in Swedish
krona (SEK) are observed at the barcode level.6 We use the terms prod-
uct and beer interchangeably to denote a beer with a certain name and
certain characteristics — Guinness Draught Beer with 4.2% alcohol by
volume is a an example of a product. Several of the products are avail-
able in different container sizes, this speciﬁc beer from Guinness is for
instance available in three different containers.We use the term variety
to refer to a speciﬁc product in a speciﬁc container, such as Guinness
Draught Beer with 4.2% alcohol by volume in a 33 cl bottle.
Systembolaget is wholly owned by the government and its purpose
is to supply alcohol without proﬁt motive (see www.systembolaget.se/
English/ for an overview). Systembolaget's suppliers are independent
proﬁt maximizing ﬁrms and Systembolaget is monitored by the
Swedish Competition Authority twice yearly on behalf of the EU to
ensure that it provides a level playing ﬁeld for different suppliers. The
suppliers of beer to Systembolaget can be categorized asmajor brewers,
microbreweries and pure importers. The major brewers are Åbro,6 In November 2000, 8.62 SEK equaled one Euro and 10.08 SEK equaled one US Dollar.
The average price for a liter of beer was roughly 4 Euros and 3.4 US Dollars, respectively.
Table 1
Observable product characteristics.
Mean Std. dev. Mean Std. dev.
Price per liter (SEK) 32.89 7.26 Bottle (.5 l) .22 –
Richness 5.70 1.75 Can (.33 l) .06 –
Sweetness 2.22 1.33 Can (.5 l) .37 –
Bitterness 6.08 2.06 Ale .07 –
Alcohol (% of vol.) 5.43 1.03 Dark lager .04 –
Advertising (mln SEK) .16 .80 Light lager .83 –
Foreign .42 – Stout .03 –
Bottle (.33 l) .35 – Wheat beer .03 –
Note: Based on 16,867 observations. Means for category or dummy variables are the
fraction of beers that fall into this category.
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the time of the merger owned by Norwegian food and drinks group
Orkla. Krönleins and Spendrups are family controlled domestic brewers
and Åbro and Kopparbergs are independent Swedish brewers. Each of
these breweries produces and sells to Systembolaget a number of its
own beers, they also produce some beers on license agreements with
foreign brewers and act as importers and wholesalers for still other
beers. For instance, at the start of the period under review Carlsberg
was the wholesaler for imported beers under the brands of Budweiser,
Caffrey's, Michelob and Staropramen. Microbreweries and independent
importers make up a small share of overall volume but control a large
number of beers.
The majority of beers and producers sell very little and as we are in-
terested in identifying the effects of a merger between the two biggest
beer producers in Sweden, we focus on the largest ﬁrms in our study.
In particular we include the eight largest ﬁrms in our analysis (the six
major brewers plus the next two in terms of size, see Table (A.1) for
the average market shares). These ﬁrms account for more than 95% of
the total market volume during our sample period.7
Apart from prices and liters sold, Systembolaget provides other use-
ful information on product characteristics in its catalogs. These catalogs
are freely available online or in the retail outlets of the monopoly, so
that consumers have easy access to them. The observable characteristics
are presented in Table (1) along with their means and standard devia-
tions. Beers are classiﬁed into the following categories: ale, dark lager,
light lager, stout and wheat beer segments.8 We exclude beers that
are not sold in one of the standard sizes, namely bottles and cans of
around .33 or .5 l.9
The retail monopoly also provides consumers with taste informa-
tion. It attributes to each beer values for richness, sweetness and bitter-
ness, which are all measured on a scale from 1 to 12, where higher
values indicate a more intense taste. We also observe alcohol content
and a measure of advertising expenditure.10 During the period of
study advertising of alcoholic beverages was illegal in Sweden. An ex-
emption was made for beer with an alcoholic content below 2.25% of
volume. These kinds of beers could be freely sold in regular supermar-
kets. In cases where such a low-alcoholic beer has the same name as a
high-alcoholic beer sold in the outlets of Systembolaget, we expect
some spillover from the advertising expenditure on the low-alcoholic
version to demand for the high-alcoholic product. We observe positive
advertising expenditure, deﬁned in this way, for less than 9% of our
observations.
3.2. Systembolaget's pricing policy
The retail monopoly enforces uniform pricing for each beer variety
across all of its stores in Sweden. The retail monopoly applies a ﬁxed
formula when determining the prices charged to retail consumers.
prj ¼ pwj þ xajτa
 
1þ τcð Þ 1þmks þ dj ð1Þ
pj
r and pjw are the retail and wholesale price of beer j, respectively. τa
and τc are the alcohol excise tax and value-added tax, while
mks and dj are the markup of the retail monopoly and the deposit for
the packaging of product j, respectively. xja is the alcohol content offered
by beer j. Eq. (1) is publicly known. Systembolaget does not control the
alcohol excise tax, the value added tax or its ownmarkup. Both taxes, as7 Excluding minor brands or competitors is common in structural merger analysis. In
the merger analysis of Nevo (2000a), for instance, the data covers between 55 and 60%
of national market shares.
8 The term light refers to the color of the lager not its caloriﬁc content.
9 Cans of .45 l and .6 l are included, but kegs of 3 l are excluded in the demand estima-
tion. The volume and sales share of dropped package sizes is minuscule.
10 Source: Research International/SIFO. Advertising expenditure is the estimate of the to-
tal cost of advertising for a given beer inmagazines, newspapers, television and billboards
based on observed advertising.well as the retail markup are set by Swedish parliament. The deposit for
the different kinds of packages is small relative to the retail price of the
beer. Thus, when ﬁrms set wholesale prices, they are in effect directly
determining the ﬁnal retail price charged to consumers. This means
that we, in contrast tomuch other work on the price effects of upstream
mergers, do not need to make assumptions about unobservable retailer
markups.
3.3. The merger and the divestiture requirements
The takeover of Pripps by Carlsberg had an international dimension
and was investigated by competition authorities in Denmark, Finland,
Norway and Sweden. Carlsberg merged with Norwegian brewery
Ringnes, which owned Pripps. 11 According to reports at the time of
themerger, one importantmotivationwas that Carlsbergwanted access
to Baltic Beverages Holding Co., which had a strong position in the
Russian beer market, and of which Ringnes owned 50%. Carlsberg and
Pripps also sell beer with alcohol content below 3.5% of volume that is
retailed in supermarkets as well as bottled water and carbonated soft
drinks. By focusing on the market for beer with alcohol content above
3.5% of volume, we thereby only examine part of the merger. This part
is viewed as a separate relevant market in product and geographic
space by the Swedish Competition Authority.
During the fall of 2000, the merger is investigated by the Swedish
Competition Authority and, conditional on a number of divestitures,
the authority announces that it does not challenge the merger in
December 2000. The merger is consummated in February 2001. The
agreed upon divestitures are implemented in two steps. In February
2001, when the merger is consummated, the merging parties divest a
total of 19 beer varieties, for instance the products associated with the
brands of Bass, Caffrey's and Staropramen in addition to a number of
purely domestic products such as Arboga and TT. The acquirer of all
these beers is the ﬁrmGalatea, which at the time of themerger captures
a negligible share of the market. 12
Table (2) presents information about the concentration level as well
as the number of beers sold and the share of total volume for theﬁrms of
particular interest in themerger. The set of beers that are divested in the
consummation of the merger in February 2001 are also shown. We do
not strip these beers from the pre-merger holdings of Carlsberg and
Pripps. Adding all the market shares during this period across columns
therefore double counts these beers.
Until themerger in 2001, the concentration level in the industry falls
from .24 to .21. The clearing of the merger, however, raises the
Herﬁndahl–Hirschman Index (HHI) above .25 and thereby, according
to the U.S. merger guidelines, changes the industry concentration level11 Ringnes was itself owned by Orkla, the Norwegian food and drinks group. A joint en-
tity was created under the name Carlsberg Breweries, with Orkla receiving a 40% share.
12 Almost two years later, in November 2002, themerged ﬁrm also divests two varieties
of LapinKulta to Åbro, by that time the third largest producer in termsofmarket share. The
beers divested at the time of themerger account for 63% of the volume to be divested. Be-
cause of the long period separating the merger from the Lapin–Kulta divestitures our ex-
amination focuses on the beers that are divested at the time of the merger.
Table 2
Market shares and number of beers by ﬁrm.
Year HHI Carlsberg Pripps Spendrups Divestitures Galatea
.24 .22, 28 .26, 26 .24, 39 .09, 11 .005, 11
.23 .20, 30 .26, 26 .27, 45 .07, 11 .003, 11
.22 .19, 31 .26, 27 .24, 46 .09, 13 .002, 13
.23 .23, 31 .27, 26 .20, 41 .07, 15 .003, 12
.21 .29, 27 .17, 23 .19, 40 .06, 19 .003, 12
.25 .43, 52 – .20, 37 .06, 19 .071, 31
.25 .41, 48 – .21, 35 .05, 15 .114, 34
Note: For the ﬁrm columns, the ﬁrst number reported is the ﬁrm's average annual market
share. The second number is the average number of beer varieties theﬁrmsold during that
year rounded to full integers. We do not report 2003, because we only include January
of 2003 in our sample. The divestitures are also included in the pre-merger numbers
reported for Carlsberg and Pripps.
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account for almost half the total volume and their combined portfolios
include 50 beer varieties. The beers divested in February 2001 account
for 6% of the total liters sold and are controlled by Galatea in the post-
merger period. Before the merger, Galatea accounts for a negligible
share of the market, even though it sold 12 varieties in the outlets of
the retail monopoly. Spendrups becomes the second largest producer
following the merger, and accounts for roughly a ﬁfth of total volume
and sells around 40 varieties.
4. A difference-in-difference analysis of the merger's effects
As we will see below there was little effect on prices, despite the
merger of two ﬁrms that jointly control roughly half of the market.
This could be the result of a limited market power effect of the merger,
or it could reﬂect cost or demand shocks that counteract the incentives
to raise price.13 Ourmain interest is to assess if the divestitures associat-
ed with the merger are contributing to the muted price response post-
merger. As in the ex-post evaluations of mergers in Focarelli and
Panetta (2003), Hastings (2004) and Ashenfelter and Hosken (2010)
we adopt a difference-in-difference regression approach. As argued by
Angrist and Pischke (2010), the methodology has proved fruitful in
many areas of economics. While acknowledging the value of
difference-in-difference estimates in describing patterns, we should
also note that applying themethod tomajor mergers in a national mar-
ket is fraughtwith difﬁculty— any “control” group thatwe deﬁne is pos-
sibly also affected by the merger. In particular we may fear that if a
merger triggers the merging parties to raise their prices others in the
market will also raise their prices which may lead to a downward bias
in the estimated coefﬁcient on the price effect of the merger on the
merging parties. As we discuss below, the results and robustness exam-
inations that we perform do not indicate such a bias. Nevertheless we
would like to stress that results on a merger between the two largest
ﬁrms in a national market should be viewed with more humility than
we view for instance results on the effects of class size on student
achievement, where natural experiments can provide us with exoge-
nous variation across a large number of otherwise comparable observa-
tions (see Einav and Levin (2010) for a further discussion of the relative
merits of demand system estimation vs. difference-in-difference
methods in merger cases). Thus, we regress the log-price of variety j13 The two most prominent sources of market-wide changes of prices of beer in
Systembolaget are changes in excise taxes and changes in Systembolaget'smarkups. There
are no such changes during thewindow studied after a change in Systembolaget'smarkup
on January 1, 2000.We have also experimented with including various cost (such as labor
costs in country of production, price of barley) and demand shocks (such as disposable in-
come) in the difference-in-difference regressions below. As many of these variables are
cointegrated their individual signiﬁcance is low and sensitive to what other controls are
included. The merger dummies as deﬁned below were stable across speciﬁcations
however.in month t on several potential price shifters. Our baseline speciﬁcation
looks as follows.
ln pjt
 
¼ γ j þ γt þ β1postt  Carlsberg jt þ β2postt  Pripps jt
þ…β3postt  divest jt þ β4postt  Galateajt þ ejt ð2Þ
γj and γt are product-container and month ﬁxed effects, respectively.
We therefore account for time-speciﬁc and persistent variety speciﬁc
shocks to prices. postt is an indicator variable that equals one if market
t is observed after the consummation of themerger and zero otherwise.
Similarly, divestjt indicateswhether beer j belongs to the set of beers that
are divested following themerger. The ﬁrm indicators are deﬁned anal-
ogously, where the indicators for Carlsberg and Pripps have no overlap
with the divested set of beers. e is the residual term.
Let us highlight two challenges in applying such a methodology to a
merger between twomajor players on a national market. One challenge
is that the mergers that are interesting for competition authorities are
typically not exogenous events that come as a surprise to the affected
parties. In consequence itmay be difﬁcult tomake a clear distinction be-
tween before and after treatment. In our case themerger was cleared in
December 2000 and consummated in February 2001, but the ﬁrms had
agreed to merge already in May 2000, possibly after long negotiations.
Strategic behavior to try to inﬂuence the terms of the deal may have af-
fected prices also before May 2000. On the other hand, the earlier one
deﬁnes the pre-merger period, the more other shocks due to for in-
stance entry and exit of beers are likely to obscure the comparison.
The concerns regarding timing are therefore difﬁcult to solve in a
perfectly satisfying manner, but as we illustrate below, our qualitative
results are not sensitive to how event windows are deﬁned.
The other major challenge in implementing difference-in-difference
evaluations of mergers regards deﬁning a control group as already
noted. Products that are faced with the same cost and demand shocks
as those involved in the merger are likely to be in competition with
the merging parties and thus the treatment may have an effect also on
the control group.14 To explore price developments we use Fig. (1)
which plots price trends for the merging parties, the divestitures,
Galatea and our preferred control (all other products). As seen average
prices for the merging parties fall relative to the control group — one
possible reason for this can be efﬁciencies due to the merger. We may
also use estimates from an estimated demand system to inform our
choice of control groups — if cross-price effects are low enough this
limits the concerns that the difference-in-difference estimation will
yield biased coefﬁcients. In Section 6.2 we return with a discussion of
how the estimates from the difference-in-difference estimation match
up with the results from the estimation of our demand system.
A requirement for an appropriate control group in a difference-in-
difference framework is that the parallel trend assumption is reason-
able — that the treatment and control would have followed the same
development absent treatment. One way to examine the reasonable-
ness of the parallel trend assumption is to consider if pricesmove in tan-
dem prior to the merger. We see that indeed prices of the merging
parties and the control follow similar trends prior to themerger. To fur-
ther examine this we have also run a regression using log-prices, where
the groups that are directly affected by themerger are allowed to follow
individual trends. The results are presented in Table (A.2) in Appendix
A. Overall, we ﬁnd that even when a pre-merger trend is estimated to
be statistically signiﬁcant, its impact is so small that our results are not
sensitive to it. We conclude that pre-merger trends are highly similar
for the control group and the treated.14 One source of identiﬁcation is to examine price developments in neighboringmarkets
that are affected by the same cost and demand shocks but not by themerger per se. In our
case the merger affects the whole country and using prices in neighboring countries as
control group is hampered by differences in market structure, that the merger affects
those nations aswell and ﬁnally Sweden's ﬂoating exchange rate creates substantial noise
in cross-country price comparisons.
Fig. 1. Price trends before and after the merger. Note: The ﬁgure plots 3-month moving
averages of the mean log-price for each of the groups. The left vertical line indicates
November 2000, the end of our preferred pre-merger window. The right vertical line
indicates March 2001, the beginning of our preferred post-merger window.
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estimate speciﬁcation (2) with several choices of pre- and post-merger
windows as well as different control groups. Columns (1) to (3) in
Table (3) vary the pre- and post-merger windows for our preferred
choice of control group. Columns (4) and (5) vary the control group.
In column (1), we deﬁne the pre-merger period to cover January–
November 2000, and the post-merger period to stretch from March
2001 to January 2003. This is the longest post-merger period that our
data allow. The control group is all beers that are not directly involved
in the merger.
The price of the divested beers are estimated to fall by about 3.2%
post-merger. This is fully in line with our stylized example above and
as can be seen from columns (2) to (5) it is robust across all of the
speciﬁcations. The divestitures therefore generate downward pricing
pressure in this particular merger. Moreover, Carlsberg and Pripps are
both estimated to decrease their prices post-merger by 1.6 and 3.2%
respectively. Following the logic of our stylized example, this ﬁnding
suggests that the set of divested products generates sufﬁcient pricing
externalities to induce the merging parties to lower their prices post-Table 3
Difference-in-difference estimates.
Dep. var. (1)
ln(pjt)
(2)
ln(pjt)
(3)
ln(pjt)
(4)
ln(pjt)
(5)
ln(pjt)
Post ∗ divest − .0319
(.0024)
− .0294
(.0023)
− .0356
(.0034)
− .0288
(.0023)
− .0528
(.0030)
Post ∗ Carlsberg − .0159
(.0020)
− .0127
(.0019)
− .0168
(.0028)
− .0130
(.0020)
− .0369
(.0028)
Post ∗ Pripps − .0316
(.0022)
− .0299
(.0021)
− .0318
(.0030)
− .0292
(.0022)
− .0533
(.0029)
Post ∗ Galatea .0261
(.0027)
.0116
(.0026)
.0316
(.0038)
.0294
(.0026)
.0074
(.0034)
Constant 1.020
(.0046)
1.018
(.0046)
1.020
(.0051)
1.290
(.0051)
1.288
(.0055)
Observations 6826 4616 5618 4089 3324
R2 .99 .99 .99 .99 .99
Note: Standard errors are reported in parentheses. Market ﬁxed effects and beer variety
ﬁxed effects are included in all speciﬁcations. In columns (1) and (2) the pre-merger
window stretches from January to November 2000. In column (3), the pre-merger win-
dow is shortened to May 2000. The post-merger window covers March 2001 to January
2003 in columns (1) and (3), while the post-merger window is shortened to January
2002 in column (2). All other speciﬁcations have the same window deﬁnitions as column
(1). In column (4) Spendrups is the control group, whereas in column (5) Bibendum, the
smallest ﬁrm in the market, is the control. In all other columns the control group consists
of all ﬁrms other than the merging parties and Galatea.merger. An alternative explanation is that the merging parties realize
efﬁciency gains in the post-merger period that overwhelm the market
power effect of the merger. Further below, we use our structural
model to shed light on this question. Finally, Galatea raises prices by
2.6% post-merger, which also squares well with the stylized example
as it takes into account the diverted proﬁt margins to the newly
acquired divestitures post-merger.
In column (2) we shorten the post-merger window to February
2002, thus covering one year following the consummation of themerg-
er. The estimated price effects are qualitatively identical and quantita-
tively similar. If anything, the effects are lessened marginally. This
indicates that to a very limited extent the price effects build up during
the post-merger period. Mostly, this applies to Galatea. In column (3),
we shorten the pre-merger window to May 2000, the point at which
the ﬁrms ofﬁcially agree tomerge, and extend the post-merger window
again to January 2003. Again, the estimated price effects are qualitative-
ly identical and quantitatively similar. The latter ﬁnding applies some-
what less to Galatea, which might simply be the case, because it had a
negligible size pre-merger. This is likely to make the prices of the
beers offered by Galatea somewhat more volatile. Overall, the results
suggest that the speciﬁcation is quite robust to the choice of pre- and
post-merger window.
We next turn to the choice of control group. In column (4), we
choose Spendrups, the largest rival to the two merging parties, as the
control group. This is the ﬁrm for which demand and cost shocks are
likely to be the most similar to those of the merging parties. We see
that the estimated price effects are similar to the results in columns
(1) to (3). In column (5), we choose Bibendum as the control group.
This ﬁrm is somewhat larger than Galatea in terms of market share
and is therefore the second smallest ﬁrm in the sample at the time of
the merger. The estimated price effects turn out to be much larger in
magnitude than with Spendrups as the control. Note however that
Bibendum is a wholesaler that only imports andmay thus face different
shocks to efﬁciency and demand than the merging parties. Despite
these quantitative differences, it is clear that the qualitative patterns
are identical across the different choices of pre- and post-merger win-
dows and control groups. In previous versions of this paper we also
used various sets of microbreweries as control groups and for these as
well the qualitative patterns were the same.
We adopt the choices in column (1) as our preferred speciﬁcation,
because it covers the longest post-merger period and deﬁnes the
broadest control group. We ﬁnd that the merger has a negative impact
on the merging parties' prices and that the prices of divested beers are
predicted to fall post-merger. To analyze these ﬁndings in more detail,
we turn to our structural model.
5. A structural model of the Swedish beer market
As in the merger simulation in Nevo (2000a), we follow the seminal
work of BLP, and estimate a random coefﬁcients logit model for de-
mand. The BLP framework allows for very ﬂexible substitution patterns
between product varieties and thereby breaks the independence of ir-
relevant alternatives property that substantially restricts substitution
patterns in a standard logit model. As the BLP approach is widely used
and described in detail in for example Nevo (2000b), we keep this sec-
tion deliberately short and focus on our speciﬁc choices for estimating
the model. Dubé et al. (2012) and Knittel and Metaxoglou (2014)
raise several important issues regarding computational aspects of the
estimation. We take these issues seriously in our implementation and
present the relevant computational details in Appendix A.
5.1. Deﬁnition of the relevant market
Before estimating our structural model of demand, we need to
deﬁne the relevant market. After all, if prices of all beers sold by
Systembolaget were to rise, we expect demand for beer to fall so that
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sold in the Swedish beer market follows two empirical regularities.
Firstly, the annual sales cycle is strongly seasonal with peaks in summer
and around Christmas time and troughs during autumn and early
spring. This regular pattern can be seen in Fig. (2). Each month's share
of the annual sales volume is plotted for each of the seven years. The
plot illustrates that the seasonal pattern is highly stable. Secondly, the
volume of beer sold grows on average by roughly 11% annually. Part
of this changemay bedriven by changes associatedwithmore liberal at-
titudes to alcohol following Sweden's entry into the European Union in
1995. Changes in the share of the outside good can drive substitution
patterns andwewant to avoid that a hard to verify assumption on a de-
creasing share of the outside good is driving our results. To arrive at a
stable share of the outside good, which still allows consumers to opt
for not buying beer if prices rise, we follow the approach of Conlon
andHollandMortimer (2010).We initially guess that the potentialmar-
ket size is ten times the actual number of liters sold. We then regress
this measure of potential liters sold on a full set of month ﬁxed effects,
a linear trend and a constant. This regression explains almost 94% of
the variation in the relevant market size. Our deﬁnition of the relevant
market is then the market size predicted by this regression. The
resulting share of the outside good is quite stable around 90%, but the
method still allows for substantial substitution between the inside
goods and the outside good in response to large aggregate price chang-
es. In the estimation below,we also include a full set of time ﬁxed effects
to prevent any remaining errors in our deﬁnition of the relevantmarket
to affect the estimated coefﬁcients.
5.2. Demand
We observe t=1,…, Tmonths with Jt varieties in each. The indirect
utility that a particular consumer i derives from purchasing variety j
at time t is given as follows.
ui jt ¼ xjtβ−αpjt þ ξ f þ ξt þ ι j∈ Iξb j þ ξ jt
þ
XK
k¼1σ
kxkjtv
k
i þ σpvpi p jt þ εi jt ð3Þ
ε denotes the iid logit errors or idiosyncratic taste shocks. pjt is the price
and x contains all of the observable characteristics that are presented in
Table (1). We allow for a random coefﬁcient on price and include K=3
additional random coefﬁcients on the attributes sweetness, alcohol con-
tent and the constant. The latter captures heterogeneous consumer
preferences for the outside good. Heterogeneity is captured by the sim-
ulated vi vector, which contains K draws from a standard normal2 4 6 8 10 12
0.06
0.07
0.08
0.09
0.1
0.11
0.12
month
sh
ar
e 
of
 a
nn
ua
l li
te
rs
 s
ol
d
Fig. 2. Liters of beer sold monthly and annually. Note: Each of the seven years in our
sample is plotted as a separate line. We do not plot January 2003, our only observed
market for 2003.distribution that is distributed iid across consumers.σ contains the stan-
dard deviations for the random coefﬁcients. Thus, we have αi ~ N(α, σp)
and βik ~ N(βk, σk), where α and βk are the estimated means for the
random coefﬁcients on price and the observable characteristic k.
The structural error term is disaggregated into several components
to make the speciﬁcation more ﬂexible and ensure that the iid assump-
tion is justiﬁed. Our main concern here is that there are unobserved
branding effects in the data.15 We allow for such effects along two di-
mensions. First, consumers can attach speciﬁc brand images at the
ﬁrm level. This is captured by ξf, which is a ﬁrm-level ﬁxed effect.
Second, we allow for product ﬁxed effects. We deﬁne a product here
as a beer in all its available packages; at most there are four. Advertising
expenditure also accrues at this level. ξb j is the corresponding product
ﬁxed effect. Ideally, we would allow for a full set of these product
ﬁxed effects. Due to data limitations, which we describe below in our
discussion of endogeneity, we only include product ﬁxed effects for
the products that are available in each market in the sample period.
These are products for which at least one of its packages is available in
all 84 observedmarkets. There are 52 such products and they constitute
on average 63% of volume. ιj ∈ I is an indicator variable that equals one if j
belongs to the set of these beers and zero otherwise. ξt is a time ﬁxed ef-
fect and ξjt is a demand shock that is unobserved by the econometrician.
In an ideal settingwewould allow for additional random coefﬁcients
and estimate a full covariancematrix for these coefﬁcients, as thiswould
give amore ﬂexible demandmodel.We stick to four independently dis-
tributed random coefﬁcients due to data limitations. Relevant consumer
survey data, which would have allowed us to append additional micro
moments to the estimation as in Petrin (2002), are not available.16
With the retail monopolist enforcing uniform prices across all of
Sweden, regional or store-level data would give us no additional price
variation to exploit, butwe could have included regional variation in de-
mographics directly in the estimation. Due to the national aggregation
of the data, this is not possible. Without these additional sources of ob-
servable variation, it is difﬁcult to estimate a large number of random
coefﬁcients and their covariances.17 This level of aggregation is not un-
common in the existing literature. BLP, Björnerstedt and Verboven
(2013), and Eizenberg (2014), for example, face similar data limitations.
We believe that the demand speciﬁcation that we adopt is as ﬂexible as
the data allows it to be. Moreover, note that the BLP model is typically
viewed as allowing for at least as ﬂexible substitution patterns as the
nested logit model, which has been implemented in Peters (2006) and
Weinberg (2011), and multilevel demand systems as used for example
in Weinberg and Hosken (2013). As we discuss in more detail below,
our BLP model yields a substantially better ﬁt of the data than a logit
model and the observable product characteristics strongly affect prod-
uct substitutability. Lastly, let us stress that competition authorities
are likely to be faced with similar data limitations when they have to
make a decision regarding the potential approval of a speciﬁc merger.
We believe that our frank discussion of the challenges involved and
that the results we obtain illustrate that structural demand estimation
can still be a useful tool to guide decision-making in such a setting.5.3. Supply
We assume Nash–Bertrand competition in prices between ﬁrms
to model the supply side of the Swedish beer market. There are f =15 Store coverage is another factor that can yield large systematic unobserved differences
between products. Note, however, that beers with good brand images are also likely to be
sold in most or all of the stores. These two aspects are therefore interrelated.
16 The simple reason is that the statistical ofﬁce in Sweden does not disaggregate expen-
ditures on alcoholic beverages in sufﬁcient detail.
17 In a speciﬁcation where we only allow for ﬁrm ﬁxed effects, we also attached a ran-
dom coefﬁcient to the foreign dummy. When including product dummies, however, this
ﬁfth random coefﬁcient becomes insigniﬁcant.
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portfolio of products F f.
max
pwjt
n oΠ f ¼ X
j∈F f
Mts jt prjt
 
pwjt−mcjt
 
−C f
Mt is themarket size at date t,mcjt is themarginal cost of production
for beer j and Cf is the ﬁxed cost faced by ﬁrm f. We distinguish between
retail and wholesale prices, because product shares and elasticities
are functions of the prices charged to consumers, while ﬁrm margins
directly depend on the prices charged to the retail monopoly.
Knowledge of the monopoly's pricing rule, Eq. (1), allows us to
precisely back out ﬁrm margins, pjtw − mcjt. We deﬁne κt ≡ ∂pjtr /∂pjtw =
(1 + τtc)(1 + mkts).18 The ﬁrst-order proﬁt maximization condition for
product j ∈ F f is given as follows.
X
k∈ F f
∂s jt
∂prkt
pwkt−mckt
  ¼− s jt
κ t
Switching to matrix notation, we collect the proﬁt maximization
conditions for all ﬁrms in themarket. LetΩ denote thematrix of market
share derivatives where Ωt(j, k)≡∂sk,t/∂pj,t is its entry in the jth row and
kth column. Moreover, we deﬁne the holding or ownership matrix, Ht,
whose entry in row j and column k is 1, if varieties j and k are owned
by the same ﬁrm and is zero otherwise.
Ht ⊙Ωtð Þ pwt −mct
  ¼ s prt κ−1t ; ∀t
⊙ denotes the element wise product.
mct ¼ pwt þ Ht ⊙Ωtð Þ−1s prt
 
κ−1t ð4Þ
Wholesale prices, market shares, κt and the ownership pattern are
observed directly, while the elements ofΩt are functions of the estimat-
ed demand parameters. By plugging our estimates into Eq. (4), we
obtain variety-level estimates of marginal costs.
5.4. Endogeneity
The unobservable product characteristic, ξjt, has a vertical interpre-
tation in themodel. All else equal, a higher realization of ξjt gives variety
j a greater market share. As ﬁrms incorporate this into their pricing de-
cisions, realizations of the unobservable and price will tend to be posi-
tively correlated, which in turn renders prices endogenous and biases
the estimated price coefﬁcient towards zero. Finding instruments that
shift prices at the product level while not affecting demand is a chal-
lenge in differentiated product markets. One potential instrument is
the (log of) the exchange rate which acts as a cost shifter for imported
products. We use this as one instrument.
For additional instruments we follow the instrumenting strategy of
BLP. These instruments rely on the assumption that each product's loca-
tion in characteristics space is exogenous. The optimal price of each
product depends on its own attributes as well as the attributes of all
other rival products. Given exogeneity, any function of the observed
non-price characteristics qualiﬁes as an instrument for price. As adver-
tising expenditure is optimally chosen by eachﬁrm,we exclude this var-
iable from the computation of the instruments. Unfortunately, we have
been unable to ﬁnd a good instrument for advertising. We do note,18 Themonopolist's pricing rule has changed over the sample period. Until December 1999,
it is given by Eq. (1). From January 2000 onwards, the retail price is pjtr = (pjtw(1 +mkts) +
ct+ xjtaτta)(1+ τtc)+djt,where ct is a constant chargeper container that is applied to all beers.
From January 2000, ct is 1.5 SEK. For backing out the marginal costs implied by our demand
estimates, we need ∂pjtr /∂pjtw. It is straightforward to verify that this equals (1+ τtc)(1+mkts)
for all the pricing functions.however, that in a previous speciﬁcation, where we only allow for
ﬁrm-level ﬁxed effects, the magnitude of the advertising coefﬁcient is
three times larger than the one reported below. A substantial part of
advertising's effect is therefore absorbed by the product ﬁxed effects.
This limits the bias in the estimation to some extent. Moreover, due to
legal restrictions at the time, advertising expenditure in the Swedish
beer market is only allowed for the low-alcoholic products sold in regu-
lar supermarkets. We also note that this form of indirect advertising
weakens the role of this endogeneity further. Observed changes in ad-
vertising expenditure can be caused by demand shocks for beer in su-
permarkets (at most 2.25% alcohol content) and are not necessarily
driven by demand shocks for beer in the stores of the retail monopoly.
The endogeneity of advertising expenditure therefore only carries
over fully if demand shocks in these twomarkets are perfectly correlat-
ed, something which is unlikely. Anecdotal evidence suggests that con-
sumers strongly distinguish between these two types of beer.19
This still leaves the issue of how reasonable it is to assume that the
observable characteristics are exogenous. Firms' endogenous choice of
these product attributes is an important aspect, especially in industries
where ﬁrms invest to frequently redesign their products to improve
quality over time (see for instance Goettler and Gordon (2011),
Blonigen et al. (2013)). Such a pattern, however, does not ﬁt the
Swedish beermarket well. The characteristics of a beer remain constant
once it has entered the market. This leaves the entry of new varieties
and the exit of old varieties as a means by which ﬁrms can choose char-
acteristics. Estimating an entry game with 8 players, on average 200
existing varieties and up to 9 product attributes is beyond the scope of
this paper. Moreover, Fig. (A.1) in Appendix A at least indicates that
there are no substantial trends in characteristics during our sample
period. We therefore treat product characteristics as if they are exoge-
nous in our setting.
We instrument for the price of each product with its own character-
istics, the sum of the characteristics of all other products sold by the
same ﬁrm, the sum of the characteristics of all other products sold by
rival ﬁrms and the average of the characteristics of all products that
are available at that date. To raise the variation of the instruments, we
compute them within categories. The same practice has been adopted
by Bresnahan et al. (1997).
To identify the price coefﬁcient, the instrument should vary at the
product-level acrossmarkets. Except for advertising and price, however,
all product characteristics are ﬁxed once a product has entered themar-
ket. To see how this feature of the data constrains the extent to which
we can include product ﬁxed effects, consider the following hypotheti-
cal data setting. Suppose that in addition to product characteristics
remaining ﬁxed for each variety during the sample period we also
would not observe any entry or exit. In that case, our BLP-type instru-
ments would not vary either. If we include a full set of product ﬁxed ef-
fects in such a setting, the matrix of instrumental variables becomes
singular. Another way to look at this is to realize that in this setting
the product dummies contain the same information in terms of their
correlation with prices as do the BLP-type instruments. The data on
breakfast cereals used inNevo (2000a, 2001) is very close to this setting,
which make the use of BLP-type instruments infeasible. Instead,
Hausman-type instruments, average prices in other markets, are
applied. For our data these alternative instruments are of no beneﬁt, be-
cause the alcohol retail monopoly enforces uniform pricing across all of
its stores. We do, however, observe plenty of entry and exit during our
sample period. The number of beers varies between 157 and 213. This
by itself does not solve the problem of multicollinearity between the
product dummies and the excluded instruments, because the product
dummy matrix tracks the entering and exiting of beers. When a new
beer enters the market, this changes the values of the excluded instru-
ments but also expands the product dummy matrix by an additional19 Low-alcoholic beer is still popular as a beverage over lunch, while this is not the case
for regular beer, for example.
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promise to make the use of the excluded instruments feasible. Only
products with at least one container size sold in each month are treated
with product ﬁxed effects. This has two redeeming features. First, given
that these beers are present in all of themarkets, their characteristics do
not contribute to the variation of the instruments by entering or exiting
the market. Second, given that these beers are available in all of the
seven years in the sample period, these products are also most likely
to have built up signiﬁcant brand capital. The estimated ﬁxed effects
indeed suggest that this is the case: out of a total of 52 ﬁxed effects,
44 are positive and have t-stats that are greater than 2. Only 5 have
statistically signiﬁcant negative values.
If we include additional product ﬁxed effects, the BLP instruments
are weakened substantially and our estimator runs into many of the
problems that Knittel and Metaxoglou (2014) warn about. We ﬁnd
that this is driven by ill-conditioning of the GMM estimator's weighting
matrix. This ﬁnding is in linewith simulation results reported in Conlon
(2013) who notes that the problems identiﬁed by Knittel and
Metaxoglou (2014) can be viewed as the result of weak instruments.
The data limitationswe face are not ideal, but the estimates reported
below yield sensible results. The estimatedmean of the price coefﬁcient
is roughly three times larger than the corresponding coefﬁcient esti-
mate in an uninstrumented BLP model and Table (A.3) shows that our
excluded instruments explain roughly half of the observable variation
in price, while the full instrumental variable matrix explains 78% of
the observable variation in prices.20 Moreover, the implied demand
estimates yield no inelastic demands for beer varieties so that there
are no economic outliers. Finally, as we discuss in more detail below
the marginal cost and markup estimates give reasonable numbers.
5.5. Estimation results
The estimates are reported in Table (4). Consumers on average value
beers that are richer in taste, and dislike both relatively sweet, relatively
bitter and high-alcoholic beer varieties. The estimates also point to a
homebias. Among the ﬁve beer categories, ales and stouts aremost pre-
ferred,while among the packages, the .33 liter can ismost preferred. Ex-
cept for the constant, all of the random coefﬁcients are statistically
signiﬁcant and as the large value for the Wald statistic shows, the data
strongly rejects the standard logit model against the BLP model. We
ﬁnd substantial heterogeneity in consumers' sensitivity to price and
consumer taste for alcohol content and sweetness. Moreover, apart
from being signiﬁcant in a statistical sense, the random coefﬁcients
also substantially impact substitution patterns. The average cross-
price elasticity is more than six times larger than the elasticity implied
by the corresponding logit model.21 The estimated price coefﬁcient is
highly statistically signiﬁcant and implies an average own-price elastic-
ity of roughly−6. This value is close to previously obtained demand es-
timates for beer reported in Hausman et al. (1994) and Slade (2004).
The point estimates imply that all variety demands are elastic.
5.5.1. Marginal costs and markups
To examine the implications of our estimates more closely, we turn
to the backed-out marginal costs and markups for the ﬁrms that act as
suppliers to Systembolaget, which are summarized in Table (5). The es-
timated average markup of around 38% is close to the estimates report-
ed by Goldberg and Hellerstein (2013), who estimate a BLP model for
beer demand in the greater Chicago metropolitan area.
A potential gauge for how reasonable these implied markups are, is
to compare these structural estimates with their accounting equiva-
lents. We could ﬁnd accounting data for Carlsberg and Spendrups for20 For the sake of brevity, we do not report the uninstrumented estimates.
21 By corresponding logit model, we mean the model that has identical point estimates
for the means of all the coefﬁcients, but sets the standard deviations of the random coef-
ﬁcients to zero.each year in the sample period. Using sales net of excise taxes and the
reported cost of goods sold from annual reports we can calculate mark-
up over average variable cost at the ﬁrm level as 48.6% for Carlsberg and
46.7% for Spendrups. The equivalent numbers using our structural esti-
mates are 41.6% and 39%, respectively. We should not expect a perfect
match as the accounting data are the aggregate for all product lines
and both ﬁrms also produce non-alcoholic beverages. Furthermore, a
long tradition of empirical work in Industrial Organization also stresses
that we cannot equate accounting costs to economic costs. With these
caveats in mind, it is reassuring that our structural estimates are of
similar magnitude as the accounting ﬁgures.
6. A structural analysis of divestitures on merger outcomes
Our estimated structural model allows us to analyze post-merger
outcomes in a ceteris paribus fashion, which is not possible in the
difference-in-difference approach.Due to a lack of observable cost infor-
mation, we abstract from the possibility of post-merger efﬁciency gains
throughout the counterfactuals. Instead, we holdmarginal costs ﬁxed at
their pre-merger values. In a ﬁrst scenario, we simulate the post-merger
equilibriumwithout imposing any divestiture requirements. This allows
us to isolate themerger'smarket power effect. The second counterfactu-
al also abstracts from efﬁciency gains, but imposes the divestiture re-
quirements of the actual merger. The difference in outcomes between
the ﬁrst and second counterfactual tells us how effective the actual di-
vestitures are in dampening post-merger price increases and consumer
welfare losses that are due to the merger's market power effect.
Market equilibrium prices and quantities are determined by the
system of ﬁrms' proﬁt maximization conditions.
pc ft ¼ cmct− Hc ft ⊙ Ω^c ft pc ft ; bξt  −1sc ft pc ft ; bξt  ð5Þ
Given the changed ownership pattern, which is reﬂected inHtcf, we
solve for the counterfactual prices that satisfyﬁrms' proﬁtmaximization
conditions. As is common in the literature, we ﬁx the unobservables at
their pre-merger level and we consider the case where the product
offering remains constant; there is no entry and exit.
6.1. The observed divestitures' impact on post-merger outcomes
Table (6) presents the results regarding the impact of actual divesti-
tures onmerger outcomes in detail. The price effects are reported in the
top panel, while the middle and bottom panels report proﬁt and con-
sumer welfare effects. We ﬁrst focus on columns (I) and (II), the coun-
terfactual scenarios that do not allow for the merging parties' post-
merger efﬁciency gains. The 95% conﬁdence bounds show that all the
relevant pricing effects are statistically signiﬁcant. In column (I) we
present the case where a merger is cleared without divestitures and
without efﬁciency gains. The market-wide average price increase
post-merger is 1.6%, while this ﬁgure drops by two thirds if the divesti-
tures are implemented as shown in column (II). The divested beers
themselves are predicted to raise their prices by on average almost
3.6% if they are owned by the merging parties post-merger. If control
of these beers goes to Galatea, on the other hand, the divestitures on av-
erage lower prices by almost 4%. This effect is fully in line with our styl-
ized example above and mirrors our ﬁndings in all speciﬁcations of the
difference-in-difference regression of prices. The loss of the diverted
proﬁt margins makes it optimal for Galatea to charge lower prices on
the divested beers.
With regard to themerging parties, we can see two asymmetries. As
implied by the stylized model, Pripps, the smaller party to the merger,
raises prices more strongly than Carlsberg, irrespective of whether the
divestitures go to Galatea or not. The second asymmetry is that the
divested beers are much more effective at reducing the price increases
of Carlsberg's beers. This is driven by the fact that most of the
Table 4
Estimation results.
Mean Std. dev. Mean Std. dev.
Price per liter (SEK) − .2063
(.0239)
.0439
(.0142)
Dark lager − .6878
(.0493)
–
Richness .1141
(.0075)
– Stout .6650
(.1139)
–
Sweetness − .2458
(.0531)
.4305
(.0334)
Wheat beer − .5882
(.1427)
–
Bitterness − .0603
(.0053)
– Can (.5 l) .9668
(.0237)
–
Alcohol (% of vol.) −1.543
(.6057)
1.221
(.2649)
Bottle (.33 l) .6014
(.0311)
–
Advertising (mln SEK) .1089
(.0084)
– Can (.33 l) 1.645
(.0823)
–
Foreign .3125
(.0382)
– Constant .1115
(.9603)
.1765
(5.255)
Ale 1.217
(.1118)
–
R2 42 η j j −5.95 # ηjj N−1 0
Wald-Stat. ~ χ2(4) 278.6 η jk .0202 η jk;logit .0031
Note: Based on 16,867 observations. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. Fixed effects for products that are available in every month during the sample period, monthly ﬁxed
effects and ﬁrm ﬁxed effects are included in the speciﬁcation, but not reported. η j j and η jk are the average own- and cross-price elasticities implied by the reported point estimates
and η jk;logit is the average cross-price elasticity implied by setting all the estimated standard deviations of the random coefﬁcients equal to zero.
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the loss of the diverted proﬁt margins impacts Carlsberg's pricing deci-
sions more strongly. Finally, Galatea gains some market power by con-
trolling the divestitures post-merger and can thereby raise the prices
of the beers it owned pre-merger by on average 1%.
The middle panel reports proﬁt changes for each of the merging
parties. Without the divestiture requirements the merger would raise
proﬁts for the merging parties. We also see in column (I) that the out-
sider ﬁrms beneﬁt more strongly from the pricing externalities generat-
ed by the merger than the merging parties themselves. This is in line
with the theoretical results of Deneckere and Davidson (1985). In col-
umn (II) we note that the merger is unproﬁtable if the divestiture re-
quirements are imposed. It is important however to note that this
drop in proﬁts is entirely due to the loss of revenue from the divested
beers. If we only consider the beers that are sold by Carlsberg and Pripps
before and after themerger, the combination of the two product portfo-
lios is proﬁtable. The gain in market power, however, is not sufﬁcient to
compensate for the lost proﬁt from the divested beers.
Why then do Carlsberg and Pripps merge? First, we do not know
how much Galatea paid for the acquisition of the divestitures and the
acquisition feemay havemore than compensated for the lost proﬁt. Sec-
ond, and probably more importantly, the acquisition of Pripps' opera-
tions in Sweden is only a fraction of the merger's total volume. As
noted above, Carlsberg's aim is to gain control of Baltic Beverages Hold-
ings, which is one of the biggest producers of beer in Eastern Europe.
Subsequent developments point to the importance of this motivation:
during the three years from 2011 to 2013 Carlsberg's proﬁts inTable 5
Implied marginal costs of production and markups at the producer level.
Percentile Marginal costs (SEK per liter) Markups (%)
1st 1.92 17.3
5th 3.24 19.9
10th 3.90 21.8
50th 6.50 38.7
90th 15.4 50.9
95th 17.3 55.7
99th 22.1 67.1
Mean 8.07 37.9
Std. dev. 4.56 11.6
Note: Based on 16,867 observations. The reported ﬁgures are computed by pooling
all backed-out marginal costs and markups for the sample period. The markup of product
j is deﬁned as (pjw−mcj)/pjw.the Russian market alone are roughly ten times as large as its Swedish
market proﬁts.22
It therefore seems reasonable that Carlsberg is willing to make some
sacriﬁces to get the Swedish competition authority's approval for the
merger.
The bottom panel reports the merger's welfare effects. Approving
the merger without divestitures yields almost 5 million SEK of welfare
losses. As with prices, the divestiture requirements prove effective in
dampening the adverse effects of the merger. The loss in welfare is
more than halved to 2.1 million SEK as a result of divestitures.
6.2. Comparing the predictions of the difference-in-difference regression
with the structural simulation of the merger's price effects
Aﬁrst point regarding a comparison of the twoways of gaugingprice
effects is that structural demand estimates may be used to inform the
choice of control group in difference-in-difference estimation for ex-
post evaluations of mergers. For instance, while Spendrups is likely to
be the most similar to Carlsberg and Pripps in terms of cost structure
and demand shocks, onemayworry that its priceswould be strongly af-
fected by the merger. The results in Table (6) suggest that Spendrup's
price response, at 0.14%, is low enough not to have a major qualitative
impact on the difference-in-difference estimates, even if it is signiﬁcant-
ly different from 0. This supports the notion that biased results because
of the treatment having an effect on the control group is not a major
concern in the difference-in-difference estimates.
Let us now turn to a closer comparison of the results from simula-
tions in Table (6) with the difference-in-difference estimates of the
merger's price effects in Table (3). Qualitatively the results rhyme
well: Prices of divested products fall, prices for the acquirer's legacy
products rise and the price effects of the merging parties are relatively
minor. There are also some divergences however — quantitatively the
estimates do not match fully. For instance the simulations indicate
that ceteris paribus Carlsberg prices increase by 1.6% whereas the
difference-in-difference estimates point to a fall in the price of Carlsberg
products of 1.6%. The difference is most marked for Pripps' products.
A ﬁrst set of possible reasons for the divergence is that shocks after
themerger affect different products in differentways.While the treated
and the control group are similar, and we cannot reject parallel trends22 Based on accounting data for Baltic Beverages Holding and Carlsberg Sweden from
www.largestcompanies.com.
Table 6
Change in average prices relative to blocking the merger (in percent).
(I) (II)
No divestitures
No efﬁciency gains
Actual merger
No efﬁciency gains
Carlsberg 3.04
[2.45, 4.19]
1.57
[1.29, 2.03]
Pripps 6.46
[5.07, 9.82]
4.94
[3.87, 7.66]
Divestitures 3.58
[2.88, 5.01]
−3.96
[−6.10,−3.19]
Spendrups .32
[.22, .64]
.14
[.10, .26]
Galatea − .04
[− .25, .00]
1.05
[.85, 1.48]
All beers 1.60
[1.26, 2.36]
.53
[.41, .76]
Change in ﬁrm proﬁts relative to blocking the merger (in percent)
I II
Carlsberg 3.53
[2.71, 6.03]
−15.5
[−15.8,−14.5]
Pripps .17
[− .65, .22]
−8.60
[−10.8,−7.88]
Joint 2.51
[1.90, 4.22]
−13.4
[−13.6,−13.3]
All ﬁrms 5.46
[4.26, 8.40]
2.21
[1.75, 3.27]
Change in consumer welfare relative to blocking the merger (in mln SEK)
I II
CWi− CWblocked −4.83
[−8.10,−4.42]
−2.08
[−4.94,−1.26]
Note: In the actually observed merger, the divested beers are controlled by Galatea post-
merger. The simulations are computed using the observed market outcomes in the
month prior to the consummation of the merger, January 2001. 95% conﬁdence bounds
are reported in brackets. These conﬁdence bounds are computed with a parametric boot-
strap procedure. 1000 draws from the estimated asymptotic covariance matrix are used.
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post-merger developments. For difference-in-difference applications in
education or labor economics, where we often have a large number of
treated individuals, such idiosyncratic shocks may be expected to
wash out. In contrast we are here analyzing results for no more than
four ﬁrms. Key potential shocks are due to i) costs, ii) demand shocks
that affect a particular product or iii) entry and exitwhose effectwill dif-
fer across products. As regards costs it is clear that efﬁciencies are a key
part of the motivation for a typical merger. Assuming zero efﬁciencies,
as we do in Table (6), is therefore likely to overstate the price effect of
the merger. One way to explore this is to back out the cost savings
that are consistent with the estimated demand system and post-Table 7
Backed out marginal cost changes in the post-merger period.
Dependent variable lnðcmcÞ lnðcmcÞ
Post ∗ divest − .0004
(.0040)
Post ∗ Åbro − .0090
(.0035)
Post ∗ Carlsberg − .0500
(.0037)
Post ∗ Kopparbergs .0097
(.0043)
Post ∗ Pripps − .1052
(.0038)
Post ∗ Krönleins − .0297
(.0041)
Post ∗ Galatea .0086
(.0044)
Constant .7653
(.0058)
Post ∗ Spendrups − .0157
(.0036)
R2
Observations
.99
6826
Note: The pre- and post-merger windows are deﬁned identically to column (1) Table (3).
The control group is made up of the beers sold by Bibendum. Choosing the same control
group as in column (1) of Table (3) yields somewhat lower post-merger efﬁciency gains
for Carlsberg and Pripps of respectively roughly 4 and 10%. Standard errors are reported
in parentheses. Market ﬁxed effects and beer variety ﬁxed effects are included.merger prices, as we do in Table (7). Such an exercise suggests substan-
tial efﬁciencies — around 5% for Carlsberg and around 10% for Pripps.
We lack exogenous information on marginal costs in these ﬁrms so
we cannot draw conclusions about the extent to which efﬁciencies
drive observed price developments. What we can say, however, is that
efﬁciencies will drive down observed differences between the simula-
tions and the difference-in-difference estimates and that marginal cost
savings of 10% for Pripps and 5% for Carlsberg would be sufﬁcient to
bring them more or less fully in line. One way to explore if idiosyncra-
sies are driving results is to use the structural model to make ex-post
comparisons under different scenarios. We have also performed coun-
terfactual simulationswherewe include the observed post-merger esti-
mates of demand shocks, ξ, in the simulation, but found these to have a
minor impact on the simulated price effects. Moreover, we have inves-
tigated the role of entry and exit by simulating post-merger outcomes
where we correctly anticipate observed changes to product selection.
As with demand shocks, observable entry and exit has a minor impact.
Another potential reason for divergences is of course that the struc-
ture we impose — a logit model with four random coefﬁcients coupled
with static Bertrand competition is at odds with reality. If we had even
richer data and a settingwith regional price variation we could have es-
timated additional random coefﬁcients and perhaps captured substitu-
tion patterns even better. We do note, however, that the market level
prices and quantities that we use are a common type of data when
mergers are evaluated. While any demand system imposes some struc-
ture on cross-price effects, also note that the random coefﬁcients logit
model that we use is typically seen as allowing for at least as rich substi-
tution patterns as is common in applications and in published work
evaluating merger review (nested logit in Peters (2006), Weinberg
(2011) or multilevel demand systems (AID system) in Weinberg and
Hosken (2013)). As to ﬁrm behavior it may be that ﬁrms are more so-
phisticated (playing a dynamic game) or less sophisticated (using
crude estimates of demand sensitivity or being subject to behavioral
biases) than what we assume. We argue that the reasonable size of
coefﬁcients and of the backed out markups, as well as the relatively
close match with the difference-in-difference estimates point to that
the structural model performs sufﬁciently well for counterfactual
analysis to be of interest. We also have to concede that any evaluation
of “close enough” is likely to partly be in the eye of the beholder.
7. A structural analysis of divestitures — the role of recipients
and of products
We have now seen that in this case divestitures were of a sufﬁcient
magnitude to have a substantial effect on prices. This is supportive for
the use of divestitures by competition authorities. Let us in the following
use our structuralmodel to examine if we can offer some advice to com-
petition authorities on how to select recipients and which products to
require for divestment. We consider different recipients ﬁrst before
turning to the role of products and an overall discussion.
7.1. Varying the recipient for a given set of products
In the actual merger the control of the divestitures goes to Galatea
that accounts only for .3% of the volume of liters sold pre-merger. To
pin down to what extent the particular choice of recipient affects
post-merger prices and consumer welfare changes, we simulate the re-
maining 6 counterfactual merger cases. We only consider “pure” cases:
all of the divestitures go to one recipient ﬁrm. Table (A.5) presents the
simulated post-merger changes to prices and consumer welfare includ-
ing 95% conﬁdence bounds. All price changes that are of interest and all
consumer welfare changes are statistically signiﬁcant. Taking into ac-
count the conﬁdence bounds, Galatea or Bibendum, the two smallest
ﬁrms in the market are ideal candidates to receive control of the dives-
titures following the merger between Pripps and Carlsberg. The worst
possible choice, excluding the case of no divestiture requirements, is
Table 8
Recipient-ﬁrm attributes and post-merger outcomes.
Recipient Δp ΔCW (mln SEK) Sr Jr ηDIV ;r
Carlsberg–Pripps 1.601 −4.829 .4432 50 .0308
Spendrups 1.062 −3.521 .1948 38 .0186
Åbro .8940 −3.023 .1090 32 .0138
Kopparberg .7627 −2.905 .0917 16 .0239
Krönleins .7280 −2.746 .0768 16 .0194
Galatea .5293 −2.075 .0056 15 .0016
Bibendum .5213 −2.110 .0121 14 .0034
Note: Δp is the average post-merger price change in percent, ΔCW is the change in con-
sumer welfare, Sr is the recipient ﬁrm's share of market volume measured in liters sold,
Jr is the number of varieties sold by the recipient ﬁrm and ηDIV ;r is the average cross-
price elasticity between the divestitures and the recipient ﬁrm's beers.
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ingGalatea or Bibendum instead of Spendrups, the average post-merger
price increase falls by almost 51%, while the loss in consumer welfare is
reduced by 40%. These effects are economically substantial and under-
line that the choice of recipient ﬁrm can have an important impact on
post-merger outcomes.
Table (8) boils down the large amount of information to the note-
worthy patterns. Our aim is to arrive at results that are also likely to
be applicable in othermerger cases.We therefore abstract from the spe-
ciﬁc composition of each ﬁrm's portfolio and instead focus on the fol-
lowing attributes of each counterfactual scenario: the inside market
share accounted for by the recipient ﬁrm, Sr ¼∑ j∈F r s j , the number
of varieties in the recipient ﬁrm's holdings, Jr, and the average cross-
price elasticity between the divested beers and the beers owned by
the recipient, ηDIV ;r . These attributes can either be observed directly or
are easy to compute in a demand model. Inspection of Table (8) points
to that post-merger price hikes and consumerwelfare losses are greater,
the bigger the recipient ﬁrm in terms of market share and the larger the
number of varieties in its product portfolio. Moreover, the better substi-
tutes the divestitures are for the beers owned by the recipient, the
higher are post-merger price increases and welfare losses. All of these
observations are fully in line with our stylized example above. The
diverted proﬁt margins between the divestitures and the recipient
ﬁrms' beers are greater if these two sets of beers aremore substitutable,
account for a larger share of the market and if the number of varieties
controlled by the recipient ﬁrm is higher. We cannot infer a causation
in this setting, because these three attributes move in lockstep for the
counterfactual scenarios we consider. Apart from the fact that we only
have 7 observations, this strong comovement makes it impossible to
identify each attribute's effect. Our observations here, however, do
carry over to the following section, where we consider a very large
number of different sets of divestitures and can thereby estimate the ef-
fect of each attribute.
7.2. Varying the set of divested products
We next consider how the composition of the divestitures them-
selves affects post-merger outcomes— for this analysis we keepGalatea
as the recipient. To arrive at realistic counterfactual sets of divestitures,
we require that all container sizes of a product are divested to the same
recipient. It is easy to show that we cannot follow the same approach
here as we do when varying the recipient of the set of divested beers.
Enumerating all possible sets of divestitures and then simulating the
post-merger equilibrium for each of these sets lead to a prohibitive
computational burden. In the actual merger, KD = 12 products are
divested, while the merging parties jointly control ND = 44 products
pre-merger.23 Moreover, there are NR = 6 potential recipient ﬁrms.
Let NS denote the number of different sets of divestitures with KDmem-
bers each that have been sampled without replacement from themerg-
ing parties' pre-merger holdings. Then, the total number of unique sets
of divestitures is given as follows.
NS ¼ NDKD
 
NKDR ð6Þ
Setting NR = 1, as in the actual merger, this gives roughly 21 billion
unique sets of divestitures. This vast number illustrates that negotiating
remedies is not an easy task for a competition authority if the merging
parties hold large portfolios of products. This is also the case, when a re-
alistic structural demand model is available.
To tackle this problem, we use a simple approach that approximates
the entire distribution of post-merger outcomes with divestiture re-
quirements. We want to modify the composition of the divestitures23 In terms of varieties, 19 beers are divested and jointly the merging parties control 69
varieties pre-merger.and still be able to compare the simulated outcomes to the actual out-
comes in a meaningful way. To do so, we impose a market share con-
straint on each counterfactual set of divestitures. Let Si denote a
speciﬁc set of beers to be divested. We impose the constraint that the
total market share of the divested beers should lie within a symmetric
20% window of the market share that the actually divested beers ac-
count for: SDIV ;i ¼∑ j∈SiS j ∈ ½:9;1:1  SDIV ;actual.
Instead of enumerating all possible sets of divestitures and selecting
those that conform to ourmarket share criterion,we compose the coun-
terfactual sets by randomly selecting beers from the merging parties'
pre-merger holdings subject to our market share target. The details of
our heuristic approach are presented in Appendix A, where we also
describe our use of the two-sample Kolmogorov–Smirnov (KS) test
to infer if the sample size is sufﬁciently large. For each of these con-
structed sets, we simulate the post-merger equilibrium. If we draw a
sample of fSig that is sufﬁciently large, we cover all relevant cases and
can thereby approximate the entire distribution or population of poten-
tial sets of divestitures subject to our market share target. Having com-
puted the counterfactual equilibria for each of these relevant sets, we
obtain the distributions of all post-merger outcomes of interest. We
focus on welfare losses and average price changes.
Fig. (3) plots the post-merger distributions for consumer welfare
and average price changes that we obtain. The vertical line indicates
the simulated outcome of the actual merger without efﬁciency gains.
The large range of attainable outcomes for both price and welfare
changes underlines that the composition of divested beers has an eco-
nomically important impact on post-merger outcomes. Relative to the
divestiture requirements of the actual merger the post-merger price in-
crease can be reduced to only .03%. The loss in consumer welfare can be
reduced to roughly 1.6 million SEK from more than 2.6 million SEK.
Given that these effects are sizable, we next determinewhich attributes
make the counterfactual sets of divestitures successful in dampening
post-merger price increases and consumer welfare losses.7.3. Guidelines for structuring divestiture requirements
The counterfactual exercise allows us to pinpoint the set of divesti-
tures that minimizes total consumer welfare losses. Given that we ﬁnd
substantial heterogeneity in consumer preferences for beer attributes,
it is not surprising that there are several sets of divestitures that yield
consumer welfare losses very close to this minimum, but which show
limited overlap with the minimizing set. To illustrate this, we can look
at the divestiture sets yielding the ten lowest welfare losses. The
greatest relative difference among these sets is roughly 2.8% in terms
of welfare loss. These cover cases from 11 to 18 divested products.
This tells us that welfare losses among consumers with speciﬁc prefer-
ences can be compensated by welfare gains among other consumers
with different tastes for beer attributes. Analyzing this issue in detail
will not give us results that are likely to carry over to other merger
cases, because it is speciﬁc to our estimates of taste heterogeneity.
Fig. 3. Post-merger distributions of price and consumer welfare changes. Note: Based on 200,000 simulated mergers with divestiture requirements. Each panel plots the empirical distri-
bution for the selected outcome. The vertical line indicates the realized outcome in the actual merger.
Fig. 4. The elasticity of post-merger outcomesw.r.t.NDIV andηDIV ;MP. Note: In the left panel
for each of the 200,000 simulated mergers with divestiture requirements, the number of
divested beer varieties is plotted against the average substitutability between the divested
beers and the beers that remain in the holdings of the merged ﬁrm. The right panel plots
the estimated coefﬁcients γNDIV3 , while the 99% conﬁdence intervals for these coefﬁcients
are plotted using thin lines. Given the large number of observations and the clear patterns
in the simulated data, the conﬁdence intervals are difﬁcult to distinguish from the point
estimates.
13R. Friberg, A. Romahn / International Journal of Industrial Organization 42 (2015) 1–18Instead, we focus on our ﬁndings that should prove relevant to other
merger cases.
We estimate a log–log speciﬁcation below todescribe patterns in the
simulated divestitures. Let i index the counterfactual set of divestitures
and let y stand in for one of the two outcomemeasures, post-merger in-
creases in average prices,Δp, and losses in consumer welfare, ΔCW. We
relate these outcomes to the number of divested beer varieties (NDIV),
the market share of the divestitures (sDIV) and the average cross-price
elasticity between the divested beers and the merging parties' remain-
ing holdings (ηDIV ;MP).
ln yið Þ ¼ constant þ γ1sDIV þ γ2 ln NDIVð Þ þ γNDIV3 ln ηDIV ;MP
 
þ errori
ð7Þ
Our measure of the divestitures' market share is already expressed
as a fraction, so we include it in levels instead of in logs. To consistently
estimate the elasticity of the outcome variable with respect to ηDIV ;MP ,
we allow γ3 to vary for each observed value of NDIV. The left panel of
Fig. (4) illustrates why this is necessary. The number of divested beers
and their substitutability vis-á-vis themerging parties' remaining prod-
ucts strongly depend on each other. Each circle in the scatter plot repre-
sents one counterfactual divestiture scenario. Thus, for cases between
10 and 20 divested beer varieties, there are no sets that attain values
for ηDIV ;MP greater than .034. Similarly, for values of NDIV between 20
and 30, there are no observations ofηDIV ;MP below .026. The strong asso-
ciation between these two factors is driven by the underlying discrete-
ness of the problem. There are only 44 products to choose fromand each
divestiture set has to satisfy ourmarket share target. It is simply not pos-
sible to compose sets that ﬁll the space in the scatter plot. This intro-
duces a selection effect. We can still consistently estimate the
coefﬁcients by allowing γ3 to vary with each observed number of dives-
titures. This conditions on NDIV and uses the remaining observable vari-
ation in ηDIV ;MP to identify the elasticity. Finally, there is no strong
comovement between sDIV and NDIV.
Table (9) presents our results in detail.We focus on columns (2) and
(4), which present the consistent estimates. γ1 gives us the semi-
elasticity of the average price change and the consumer welfare losswith respect to these shares. In case ofwelfare loss, the unit ofmeasure-
ment for γ1 is millions of SEK. Raising sDIV has a large negative and high-
ly statistically signiﬁcant impact on both Δp and− ΔCW. Raising the
number of varieties by 1% reduces the average post-merger price in-
crease by almost 3% and lowers the aggregate loss of consumer welfare
by almost 2.7%. The share of liters sold that the counterfactual sets of di-
vestitures account for lies between 6 and 7.4%. The right panel of Fig. (4)
plots the point estimates of γNDIV3 along with 99% conﬁdence bounds for
the price and welfare regressions. Each point estimate is highly statisti-
cally signiﬁcant and shows that raising the substitutability between the
divested beers and the remaining holdings of the merging parties
dampens both post-merger price hikes and consumer welfare losses.
Fig. 5. The elasticity of post-merger outcomes w.r.t. sDIV and NDIV. Note: In the left-hand
plot, the dashed line shows the relative frequency plots ofΔp for the hypothetical divesti-
ture sets that lie above the 75th percentile of the distribution of sDIV. The solid line shows
the same plot for all the divestiture sets that lie below the 25th percentile. The plot on the
right-hand side redraws the ﬁgure using NDIV, instead.
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ﬁndings thus far: divestiture requirements prove effective in reducing
both price increases and welfare losses following the consummation
of a merger.
Summing up we ﬁnd that ceteris paribus post-merger increases in
average prices, Δp, and losses in consumer welfare, ΔCW, are lower
• if the market share of the divestitures, sDIV, is higher,
• if the number of divested beer varieties, NDIV, is higher, and
• if the average cross-price elasticity between the divested beers and
the merging parties' remaining holdings, ηDIV ;MP , is higher.
Qualitatively these results are hardly surprising but a comparison of
their relative effects and the algorithm used to simulate the effects may
be of interest to competition authorities. The estimated elasticities in
Table (9) are informative for a marginal change in the dependent vari-
ables but let us use Fig. (5) to illustrate the overall impact on the average
post-merger price increases.
Let sDIV25 and sDIV75 denote the 25th and 75th percentiles of the distribu-
tion of sDIV. The left panel shows the relative frequency histogram forΔp
for all divestiture sets i for which sDIV,i ≤ sDIV25 (solid line) and for which
sDIV,i ≥ sDIV75 (dashed line). We can see that the histograms are close,
which illustrates that varying themarket share of the divested products
over the examined range has a minor impact on post-merger pricing.
The right panel shows the same plot for the divestiture sets i that satisfy
NDIV,i ≤ NDIV25 (solid line) and NDIV,i ≥ NDIV75 (dashed line). This plot tells
a very different story. In fact, the histograms have almost no overlap
and a larger number of divestitures yields substantially lower post-
merger price increases. Due to the strong association between
NDIV andηDIV ;MP, repeating the exercise for the latter yields a very similar
ﬁgure.
The fact thatNDIVhas the greatest impact on both outcomemeasures
has a simple arithmetic reason. If themerging parties controlN varieties
pre-merger, there are N(N − 1) diverted proﬁt margins that yield
market power. If one of the varieties is divested, this number falls
to (N − 1)(N − 2) or for NDIV divested varieties it falls to (N −
NDIV)(N− NDIV− 1). This gives a higher than linear rate at which the
number of diverted proﬁt margins that remain in the merging parties'
holdings falls with NDIV. At the extreme, where the merging parties
keep only one product post-merger, the last divested beer still elimi-
nates two diverted proﬁt margins. As can be seen in Table (A.1) the
Swedish beer market is populated by multiproduct ﬁrms with aTable 9
Estimation results.
Coefﬁcient Dependent variable
lnðΔpÞ ln(−ΔCW)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
γ1 : sDIV −8.703
(.0337)
−7.685
(.0171)
−16.47
(.0342)
−16.99
(.0332)
γ2 : ln(NDIV) − .3387
(.0007)
−2.945
(.0052)
.1412
(.0007)
−2.673
(.0100)
γ3 : ; lnðηDIV ;MPÞ −1.254
(.0028)
– − .6843
(.0028)
–
γ NDIV3 – −1.013 – −1.126
minðγNDIV3 Þ – −1.338
(.0032)
– −1.761
(.0139)
maxðγNDIV3 Þ – − .1676
(.0006)
– − .1615
(.0011)
Constant −3.412
(.0113)
4.591
(.0083)
− .9599
(.0114)
5.592
(.0162)
R2 .93 .98 .57 .60
Note: Based on200,000 simulatedmergerswith divestiture requirements. Standard errors
are reported in parentheses.minimum number of 10 products and 13 varieties in their holdings.
This explainswhywe ﬁndNDIV to be so important in our setting. Inmar-
kets where ﬁrms' portfolios of products are smaller, it is likely the case
that the two remaining attributes become relatively more important.
Unless diverted proﬁt margins depend to a large extent on a single
product, competition authorities should therefore resist the temptation
to require the divestiture of the best-selling product or few large prod-
ucts. This becomes more relevant, the larger the number of products
offered by the merging parties. Divesting a larger number of varieties
with smallermarket shares will then tend to bemore effective in reduc-
ing post-merger price increases and welfare losses.8. Conclusion
In the Carlsberg and Pripps case the two largest ﬁrms in a concen-
trated market merge and the divestitures required by the competition
authority are substantial, accounting for roughly 6% of market volume.
In addition institutional factors allow access to barcode level data on
wholesale and consumer prices for the entire market.
We ﬁrst explore how divestitures affect prices using a UPP frame-
work along the lines of Farrell and Shapiro (2010). One prediction is
that prices of divested products fall and that divestitures have a
disciplining effect on the price increases that we expect on products
controlled by the merging parties throughout. These effects are consis-
tent with what we observe in a difference-in-difference analysis. Our
simulations, building on a BLP demand model, show that the effects of
divestitures on prices are substantial.
Varying the recipient and the set of divested brands, we ﬁnd that the
recipient and the number of divested products are important aspects for
a competition authority that wants to use divestitures to limit the price
increase associated with amerger. Overall, we believe that the evidence
in this paper stresses the role of merger simulations in guiding what di-
vestitures competition authorities should pursue. The implicit focus in
much discussion of the pros and cons of merger simulations is that
they should be used to determine which mergers to block and which
to allow (see for instance Angrist and Pischke (2010) and Einav and
Levin (2010)). It has also been noted that even carefully executedmerg-
er simulations are difﬁcult to bring into the court-room.We suggest that
the greatest value for merger simulations may lie in the ability to eval-
uate different divestiture arrangements. For such purposes,merger sim-
ulation can form the basis for a discussion with themerging parties and
explaining the intricacies of demand estimation to lawyers is less of an
issue.
Table A.2
Testing for the signiﬁcance of pre-merger pricing trends.
Window (1)
11/1999–11/2000
Window (2)
01/2000–11/2000
Carlsberg ∗ trend − .0007 .0007
(.0003) (.0001)
Pripps ∗ trend − .0001 .0007
(.0003) (.0001)
Divestitures ∗ trend − .0011 − .0003
(.0003) (.0001)
Galatea ∗ trend .0009 .0011
(.0003) (.0001)
Constant 1.020 1.190
(.0038) (.0068)
Observations 2609 2206
R2 .991 .996
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A.1. Firms in the sample
As we are interested in the impact of the merger of the two biggest
beer producers in Sweden, we include the eight largest ﬁrms in our
sample and leave out smaller ﬁrms such as micro breweries.
Table (A.1) presents each ﬁrm's average share of the volume of liters
sold for the pre- and post-merger periods. It also shows how many
beer varieties and beer products each ﬁrm offers on average during
the entire sample period. Recall, that we deﬁne a variety as a speciﬁc
package of a speciﬁc beer, whereas a product can be available in at
most four different packages. The substantial impact of the divestitures
onGalatea'smarket share is apparent.We also note that each ﬁrm offers
more than 10 products and at last 13 varieties during our sample. The
Swedish beer market is therefore made up of multiproduct ﬁrms with
large product portfolios. We also report each ﬁrm's share of inside
sales for the full sample containing all ﬁrms in brackets. You can see
that the shares for the restricted and full sample are very close. On aver-
age we drop less than 5% of total sales volume by only including the
eight largest ﬁrms in our sample.
A.2. Pricing trends pre- and post-merger
We explicitly test for statistically signiﬁcant differences in pre-
merger trends. Table (A.2) presents the results for two windows.
Column (2) corresponds to the pre-merger window of our preferred
difference-in-difference speciﬁcation. We can see that except for the di-
vestitures, all pre-merger trends are statistically signiﬁcant but close to
zero. Taken at face value this would be cause for concern. Column (1),
however, demonstrates that this pattern is not stable. Lengthening the
window slightly to November 1999, changes the results. The trend for
Pripps becomes insigniﬁcant and the trend for Carlsberg ﬂips sign.
Similarly, the statistical signiﬁcance of the trends for Galatea and the di-
vestitures weakens. This instability also occurs when lengthening the
window further. Different trends pop in andout of statistical signiﬁcance.
As another robustness check, we have repeated the regression in column
(1) of Table (3) using the pre-merger window that is lengthened to
November 1999. The estimated coefﬁcients barelymove. This underlines
our ﬁnding that even if some of the trends are statistically signiﬁcant,
their quantitative impact is small and does thereby not substantially
bias the difference-in-difference estimates reported in Table (3).
A.3. The observable characteristics over time
As we are assuming that the observable characteristics are exoge-
nous, we also check whether there seem to be important trends in
these beer attributes. We focus here on the taste information richness,Table A.1
The ﬁrms in the sample.
Number of
varieties
Number of
products
Share of liters sold
(1996–2000)
Share of liters sold
(2001–2002)
Carlsberg 43.5 29.0 .298 (.285) .417 (.402)
Pripps 20.0a 11.2a .251 (.240) –
Spendrups 40.6 22.1 .228 (.218) .202 (.194)
Åbro 31.3 19.3 .098 (.093) .136 (.131)
Kopparberg 15.3 10.2 .057 (.054) .063 (.061)
Krönleins 15.8 10.1 .051 (.049) .069 (.067)
Bibendum 13.8 10.1 .015 (.014) .015 (.014)
Galatea 18.2 15.3 .003 (.003) .092 (.089)
Note: Unless otherwise indicated all ﬁgures are averages over the period from January
1996 up to and including December 2002. The bracketed ﬁgures reported for the inside
market shares (share of liters sold) are the ﬁrms' inside share if we keep all the ﬁrms in
our sample, instead of retaining only the eight largest ﬁrms.
a The number of varieties and products for Pripps refers to the pre-merger period from
January 1996 to December 2000.bitterness and sweetness as well as the alcohol content. There are
systematic differences in taste characteristics between the ﬁve beer
types: ales, dark and light lagers, stouts and wheat beers. Fig. (A.1)
plots the evolution of the observable characteristics within the ale and
light lager types. These two types account on average for almost 91% of
all observations. We can see in both plots that overall the characteristics
are quite stable over time. For ales, sweetness is trending downwards
over the sample period, but stays within a rather tight range of 2.4 to
2.8. Recall that the scale for all taste characteristics ranges from 1 to 12.
Similarly for light lagers the alcohol content is trending slightly upwards.
Over the seven years in our sample, it increases by less than 6%. The ver-
tical line in both plots indicates the month immediately preceding the
consummation of the merger. The merger itself does not seem to affect
the evolution of the characteristics in a substantial manner.
A.4. Estimation details
Our estimation algorithm follows the nested ﬁxed point approach
(NFP). The NFP algorithm consists of an outer and inner loop. In the
outer loop, an optimization algorithm determines the minimum of the
GMM estimator's objective function.
Q ξ σð Þð Þ ¼ min
σ
ξTZ
 
W ZTξ
 
ð8Þ
W is the weighting matrix and Z is the matrix of instrumental vari-
ables. The GMM objective function can be expressed solely in terms of
the standard deviations of the random coefﬁcients, σ, because the
means of the random coefﬁcients are a function of σ (see Nevo
(2000b)). For each candidate value of σ, the inner loop solves for the
mean utilities, δ, that equate the observed market shares, S, with those
implied by the model, s(δ; σ), by iterating over the following contrac-
tion mapping.
δhþ1t ¼ δht þ ln Stð Þ− ln st δht ;σ
  
; t ¼ 1;…; T ;h ¼ 0;…;H ð9Þ
In our case, mean utilities are given as follows.
δ jt ¼ xjtβ−αpjt þ ξ f þ ξt þ ι j∈ Iξb j þ ξ jt ð10Þ
H is the number of iterations required to attain convergence of suc-
cessive iterates within the chosen tolerance level of the inner loop, εtol.
jjδhþ1t −δht jj ≤ εtol ð11Þ
Dubé et al. (2012) and Knittel and Metaxoglou (2014) demonstrate
potential pitfalls in the NFP approach.We take lessons from both papers
in the setup of our estimation algorithm.
Dubé et al. (2012) show that a loose tolerance for the inner loop can
cause the optimization in the outer loop to fail to converge or converge
to a point that is not aminimum.We address this issue by setting a tight
Table A.3
First-stage regression of the instruments on price.
Instrument Dependent variable
Price (SEK per liter) Price (SEK per liter) ρzi ;p
z1 − .0012* .0006 − .38
z2 .0054* − .0293* − .22
z3 − .0031* .0006 − .51
z4 − .0262* .0092* .22
z5 − .0077* − .0092* − .41
z6 − .0011* − .0008* − .48
z7 − .0214* − .0320* .28
z8 − .0170* − .0171* − .19
z9 .0018* .0052* − .42
z10 − .0026* − .0004* − .54
z11 .0146* − .0135* − .34
z12 .0049 .0049 − .43
Constant 4.610* .0050 –
Included instruments No Yes
R2 .49 .78
F-Stat. 1322 355.8
Note: Based on 16,867 observations. Coefﬁcients with an asterisk are statistically signiﬁ-
cant at the 99% conﬁdence level.ρzi ;p is the correlation coefﬁcient between the ith column
of the excluded instrument matrix and prices.
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Fig. A.1. Ale and light lager characteristics. Note: The plots show the average value of the
characteristics within the selected beer type for each of the 85 markets. Ales and light la-
gers together account for roughly 91% of all observations. Richness, bitterness and alcohol
content in percent of volume are plotted against the left-hand y-axes. Sweetness is plotted
against the right-hand y-axis. The vertical line indicates the pre-merger month, January
2001.
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cision by applying the exponential function to the contractionmapping,
Eq. (9). This speeds up the contraction considerably, however (see
Nevo, 2000b). In a similar vein, Knittel and Metaxoglou (2014) empha-
size that different initial guesses for σ can converge to different candi-
date minima. We therefore use 100 randomly generated starting
values25 for σ to arrive at a set of candidate minima. Following the rec-
ommendations inMcCullough and Vinod (2003) andDubé et al. (2012),
we verify that each of the candidate minima is indeed a local minimum.
We discard a candidate minimum if the Hessian is not positive deﬁnite
or if the Hessian is ill-conditioned. Given the set of candidate local min-
ima, we adopt the estimate with the lowest value as the global mini-
mum and base all our computations on this value for σ.
Finally, to simulate the heterogeneous tastes for product characteris-
tics, we use 350 random draws that we generate using modiﬁed latin
hypercube sampling. Hess et al. (2006) ﬁnd this method to perform
somewhat better than Halton sampling.Table A.4
Outcomes of the two-sample Kolmogorov–Smirnov test.
Subsample size Δp
# of rejections
Δpj
Average # of rejections
1000 10 6.45
10,000 5 3.65
50,000 4 4
100,000 2 4.8A.5. First-stage regression of the instruments on price
In total, we use 12 excluded instruments. 11 of these are computed
using themethod of BLP and Bresnahan et al. (1997). The remaining in-
strument, z12, is the log of the exchange rate. More than 42% of all obser-
vations cover beer varieties that are brewed abroad. It is therefore
intuitive to see that exchange rate changes are quite strongly correlated
with prices. To avoid that our results could partly be driven by weak in-
struments, we require that each of the instruments attains a correlation
with price that is at least .15 in magnitude. Moreover, we also require
that the matrix of instruments is well conditioned, which simply
means that we drop nearly collinear instruments. In the right-most col-
umn of Table (A.3), we report each instrument's correlation with price.
These range from .19 to .54 in magnitude.24 We actually set εtol = 10−16.
25 We use modiﬁed latin hypercube sampling to generate the different starting values.The excluded instruments jointly explain 49% of the observed varia-
tion in prices and are jointly highly statistically signiﬁcant as the
F-statistic indicates. Moreover, 11 of the 12 excluded instruments are
individually statistically signiﬁcant at the 99% conﬁdence level. The
ﬁrst-stage regression therefore demonstrates that our excluded instru-
ments qualify as relevant.We also repeat this regressionwith the full in-
strumental variable matrix. 78% of the observable variation in price is
explained. The included instruments do not drive out the excluded
ones, as 9 excluded instruments are still statistically signiﬁcant at the
99% level. Again, the F-statistic indicates that the instruments are jointly
highly statistically signiﬁcant. We note that the full instrumental vari-
able matrix consists of 169 columns, 143 of which are ﬁxed effects.
The latter can only help explain the level of prices, but not changes
over time. This could explain the drop in the F-statistic.
A.6. Approximating the distribution of post-merger outcomes with
divestiture requirements
Our approach for approximating the distributions of post-merger
outcomes with divestiture requirements consists of two steps. First,
we construct eligible counterfactual sets of divestitures by randomly
selecting from the merging parties' pre-merger holdings. We imple-
ment the following algorithm to construct counterfactual set i. LetSDde-
note the set of candidate divestitures. Initially this set is identical to the
pre-merger beer holdings of the merging parties. Let sDIV,actual denote
the market share that the actually observed divestitures account for.
This is sDIV,actual=.0668 of the inside market volume. Thus, we consider
divestitures that account for between 6 and 7.4% of the total liters of
beer sold.
1. Draw beer j from SD and add it to the candidate set Si.
2. If∑ j∈Si s j b :9  sDIV ;actual, remove j from SD and return to Step 1.Note: For each subsample size 100 random splits are used to implement the KS-test. Thus,
the number of rejections is out of 100. For the variety-level price change,Δpj, we compute
the average number of rejections for each of the 100 randomly generated splits.
Table A.5
Change in average prices relative to blocking the merger (in percent), no efﬁciency gains.
Recipient of the divestitures
Carlsberg–Pripps Spendrups Åbro Kopparberg Krönleins Galatea Bibendum
Carlsberg 3.04
[2.45, 4.19]
1.78
[1.37, 2.48]
1.71
[1.33, 2.28]
1.67
[1.31, 2.24]
1.67
[1.31, 2.20]
1.57
[1.26, 2.05]
1.58
[1.26, 2.07]
Pripps 6.46
[5.07, 9.82]
5.16
[3.86, 8.14]
5.08
[3.81, 7.95]
5.04
[3.80, 7.90]
5.04
[3.79, 7.87]
4.94
[3.74, 7.73]
4.95
[3.74, 7.75]
Divestitures 3.58
[2.88, 5.01]
− .76
[−1.73,− .51]
−2.13
[−3.75, 1.68]
−2.43
[−3.96,−1.93]
−2.72
[−4.66,−2.11]
−3.96
[−6.19,−3.07]
−3.88
[−6.04,−3.00]
Spendrups .32
[.22, .64]
1.41
[1.08, 2.21]
.19
[.11, .35]
.18
[.11, .34]
.18
[.11, .33]
.14
[.09, .26]
.14
[.09, .27]
Åbro .19
[.08, .34]
.13
[.05, .23]
1.48
[1.10, 2.17]
.11
[.04, .20]
.10
[.04, .18]
.07
[.03, .13]
.08
[.03, .13]
Kopparberg .14
[.06, .27]
.10
[.05, .19]
.09
[.03, .17]
1.65
[1.19, 2.47]
.08
[.03, .15]
.05
[.03, .09]
.05
[.03, .10]
Krönleins .13
[.00, .21]
.09
[.01, .16]
.08
[.00, .13]
.08
[.00, .14]
1.60
[1.16, 2.28]
.05
[.01, .08]
.05
[.01, .08]
Galatea − .04
[− .25, .00]
− .03
[− .21, .00]
− .03
[− .18, .00]
− .03
[− .17, .00]
− .02
[− .16, .00]
1.05
[.83, 1.52]
− .01
[− .11, .10]
Bibendum − .03
[− .36, .02]
− .02
[− .26, .01]
− .02
[− .22, .01]
− .02
[− .20, .01]
− .02
[− .19, .01]
− .01
[− .11, .00]
.87
[.72, 1.37]
All beers 1.60
[1.26, 2.36]
1.06
[.80, 1.58]
.89
[.66, 1.29]
.76
[.55, 1.12]
.73
[.53, 1.04]
.53
[.40, .77]
.52
[.39, .77]
ΔCW (mln SEK) −4.83
[−6.86,−3.78]
−3.52
[−5.00,−2.75]
−3.02
[−4.11,−2.33]
−2.91
[−4.01,−2.23]
−2.75
[−3.71,−2.13]
−2.08
[−2.80,−1.65]
−2.11
[−2.87,−1.68]
Note: The simulations are computed using the observedmarket outcomes in themonth prior to the consummation of themerger, January 2001. 95% conﬁdence bounds on the price and
welfare changes are reported in brackets. These conﬁdence bounds are computedwith a parametric bootstrap procedure. 1000 draws from the estimated asymptotic covariancematrix are
used.
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Here SD is not reduced by an element.
4. If∑ j∈SiS j∈½:9;1:1  Sactual, the counterfactual set of divestituresSi is
complete.
Given that we consider a wide range of market shares, we split the
20% window into 4 subintervals and draw an equal number of counter-
factual sets in each subinterval. This prevents us from drawing a sample
that is skewed towards the low end of the market share target range.
The above algorithm is then simply applied to each subinterval.
The second step of the approach infers whether the number of coun-
terfactual sets that we draw is sufﬁcient to approximate the whole dis-
tribution of post-merger outcomes with divestiture requirements that
conform to ourmarket share constraint. For a given number of counter-
factual sets of divestitures, we randomly split this sample into two
equally sized subsamples. We then use the two-sample Kolmogorov–
Smirnov test to assess if the two subsamples are in fact generated by
the same empirical distribution function. If the KS-tests fail to reject
this null hypothesis, we conclude that our sample of counterfactual di-
vestiture sets is sufﬁciently large. If the KS-test rejects the null, it must
be the case that one of the samples contains information that the
other does not. We then return to Step 1 and raise the number of coun-
terfactual sets of divestitures. This procedure is continued until Step 2 is
passed. To address the possibility thatwe get a lucky random split of the
sample that gives us a KS-test result that fails to reject the null hypoth-
esis, while the alternative hypothesis is true, we repeat Step 2 for each
given number of counterfactual sets 100 times. If the number of rejec-
tions is below 5, we pass Step 2.
Table A.4 illustrates this procedure for several numbers of counter-
factual sets of divestitures. With only 2000 sets, which gives us a sub-
sample size of 1000, the KS-test rejects the null in 10 cases, while this
number drops to 5 if we raise the number of counterfactual sets to
10,000. As should be the case, the number of rejections drops with the
number of counterfactual sets. With a subsample size of 100,000 sets,
the null hypothesis is rejected only twice out of a 100 random splits of
the sample. In the main text, we combine both subsamples and use
the full 200,000 sets to analyze the effect of the divestitures' composi-
tion. Finally, the right-most column shows the results of the KS-test pro-
cedure if we test the equality of the empirical distribution functions atthe level of individual beer varieties. For each of the 100 random splits
of the sample, we therefore conduct 200 KS-tests, because there are
200 varieties available in January 2001. The average number of rejec-
tions over the 100 splits tends to fall with the number of counterfactual
sets, but this pattern is somewhat less clear cut than for the average
post-merger price increase in the market. Some of the tails of the
variety-level price change distributions are volatile, which produces
this pattern. We ﬁnd, however, that this does not impact our results re-
ported in Table (9) in amaterialway. To drive the average number of re-
jections at the variety level close to zero, up to a million counterfactual
sets are needed. With such a large number of counterfactual scenarios,
we found a full-blown merger simulation no longer to be feasible, be-
cause of the high computational burden. For such a large number of
counterfactual scenarios, we recommend switching to an approxima-
tion to merger simulation, such as UPP. As this aspect does not impact
our results in a material way, we stick to the more precise merger sim-
ulation with only 200,000 counterfactual sets.
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